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CHAPTER I
INTRODOOTIOtf
one evening back In the w1nter of 1780-1781, the Unlve
s1t~

ot KOenlglberg's molt enl1ghtened protellor leaned baok trom

the 11ttle <lelk 1n hi. pr1Tate Itud1 andsm11ed.
1t wall

81. manuscr1pt ot the Crltlsue

tbe prlnter'

~

l!£!

At last, there
Rea.on read1 tor

AS be lat thera aUllng over the alght or more ,.ear,

ot work tbat bad gona 1nto thl. book, Immanuel IAnt was wall
aware ot the Intluence It mlght eaall7 bave--ln tact, probably
would bave.Be knew tbat the l1te or death ot the old metapbJ",

108

would depend on hi8 publlshing this book.

hesitate to klll luch a Dothersome

Why'

should he

8elt-contrad1ctor~

Becuba'

Thls was tbe war to put an eDd to all indemonstrable assertion••
So he sent his manu,cr1pt to the printer.

The tlrst

ed1tlon appeared.

It was not too well recelved, but a second

edltlon tollowed.

Slowl,. Intere.t 1n Prote •• or Kant began to

grow and the tempo ot the prlnt1ngs quickened.
Eng11.h presses .ere
human rea.onlng.

rela~1ng

Soon French and

to tore1gn reader. his ana1781. ot

All the otMr major languages began tel11ng

Kant'l .. 18age .0 ettectuallY that gradually a ne" race of men
began to appear.
1

2

Thi. race of man •• e.d decent and godl:1 enough.

What

if they could not prove the existenoe 01' God, the treedom of the
wl11, or the immortality 01' the soult

-trust· 1n them.

They could alw.7. just

Granted tbat there exlsted tor them. ·oontI-

nental dlvlde D between speoulatlve and praotical thougbt, stl11
It waa because of this spllt that they were all autonomous.
Sinoe they were now the lawmakers tor their own aotlons, the,-

were reaponsible to no ultImate authorlt.J above or beyond
selves.

the~

What could give men more dignlt7 than thla auton0mJ ot

the ira ,

So the intelleotual progeny of Kant bas multiplIed
untl1 toda1, almost one hundred and titt1 ,.ears after his death.
This race of men and their deeds g1ve tar more e vldence trom
whioh to judse the true import 01' the Or! t19\\8 01' Pure aeaaon

tban the atud10ua proteasor 01' Koenlg.berg enjoyed in his sllent
stud,. tha t evening long ago.
01' course Kant r s influenoe bas been auamented b1 mat1J'

subsequent thinker. in eyery field who consoiously or unconscious

11 have used the lImitations and dogma
starting points.

01' his ~rlti9.u. as thelr

Yet Kant remains the saminal point 1 trom

Which--even more tban trom neacartes--modern pbllosopbJ has been

1

01'. P. J. Thonnard, Precis d'Hi8tO!N de la Phil0.0-

Cr.

allo :toaap! 1."""te'1gh'Eon,
nt, the Seminal Thinker,· Immanuel I'aDt, 1'1M-1924, Chioago
1925, 85-86.
. iiie, Par18, 1946, 449 and 618.

3

shot through with subjectivism, modern morals with irrationalism,
and modern living with its slavery to misconceived freedom.

To

bring out tne real significance of Kant's work same development
of these ideas seems

necessary~

Since the time of Kant one can truly question whether
there has developed any philosophy whlch did ambrace all the
reality that a philosophioal system can embraoe.

Hegelts Ideal-

Ism, oomte t • Posit1v1sm, Mill's Utilitarianism, James's Pragmatism, and Dewey's Instrumentalism--all aooept, at least 1mpllcit-

ly, Kant's reply to bt. central problem about synthetio judgment •
.! Erior1.

They e1 ther build upon his reply or reject the cOUlua-

quenee. that R4nt or othsrs drew from 1t while still clinging to
the fundamental posit1ons.
There 1s ample evidence of tba .ubjectivism that the
"Oopernican Revolution" of IAnt has breathed 1nto modern philosophy.

!lost of tad ..,.'. philosopher. rarel,. go beyond the problem

ot knowledge, belng locked thereby wlthin the subjective s.lt.
Then there are thinkers who approve as worth while only tho••
idea. whioh are advs.ntag&ous to themselv...

A man of thla type

will admit that there may be an Arohiteot of the unlv81"., but

win Rot go on to say that there 1s a God, simply becauae h8 ••••
no profit tor hlma.lt in such an a •• ertion. 2 Even the watohword

a ct. for example, W. F. G. Swann, ~ Arohit.cture ot
the Universe ..... York, 1934, 394-395. Swannt~nEng i. 'E7Proal 01 maD ra mat11ts in both the
t.

ot current philosophy, "It works'" always has the connotation, at

-

least, of working tor me.
In the field ot religion this subjectivism show. it ••lf

1n indifterence eIther to any particular religious denomination
or to the

wr~le

idea of religion 1n general. 3

Could relizion

have been branded so easily and accepted so widely as the "opiate
ef the people" if someone even before Hegel had not first divorcee

from the metaphysical baai. of religion that sYltem of maralit,.
which people know is no opiate'

And even 1n morals there 1s the

odd spectacle today of man conceIving of the mora117 good and
bad--lf the,. admit they can be distinguished at a11--&8 merel,.
subjective values, and foroing themaelves to try observing the
shell ot a moral l1fe without the motIVation of the love of God,
hope of reward, or fear

ot punishment, tor

Kant bad dlscarded

such motivation aa unethical 1n the Critigue

!!

Practioal Reason.

Instead, manJ moderns are trying to hobble along on the rlcketr
crutches of reputation and self-respeot alone.
While keeping in mind the other influences contributing
to the stark reality which is todayls world, one can scarcely be
accused ot exaggeration if he g1ves the toremoat pla.ce after
Original Sin to Immanuel ltant.

.0

thinking man oan long doubt

3 at. J. Donat, S. J.. ItMea Generalls, 1n SUJIDIIL
PhilosoRMa. Ohristian.... Edltl0 Quaria. IDnlbrUCk, 19Sa, Xle

ana 1"!X.

•
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the real significance and tho collosal impact of tae answer given
by the man trom Koenigsberg to his simple starting questIon, "How

are synthetie judgments

~ ~riorl

possible?"

It 1s preoisely beoause the reality of teda,.'. worle!
1s bleak, that more critical eyes are turning daily not only to
Kant 'a

starting question, but alao and especially to th€ 511PPO-

sltlons 111ns beneath that questIon.

For they see only too

clearly that practIcally all the activities of modern non-achola.
tic philosophy are dependant on Kant's question and its supposi-

tions

~n

one waT or other, either as development. of or reactions

to Kant's doctrine.

For

~xample,

two important luppositions ot Kant are

that synthetic judgments

~

21'101'1 actually exlat,4 and that

2r10r1 forma are tbe only way of explaining them.!
today is:

~

The question

Do theae suppositions rest on grounds tbat are them-

selves solid'

Or, perhaps, did ltant take for granted the ground.

themselves of these suppositions?

Could these grounds beneath

Kant'. own suppcslt10ns perhaps have been the fundamental prine1..
plea "hi oh everyone acoepted as true and unassailable in ltUlt'1

day, but which further investIgation and experience have shown to
• Immanuel Kant, critique of Pure Reason, trans. 3. M.
D. MeiklejobJJ, 'l'ba Everyman'. tfSraryedl\Ion, lew York, 1946,
32. In the tol.lowing page., this work and this edition w11l be
referred to .imply as the Critique.
5

IbId. 59 and 71.
,i
I
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be highly questionable'
It should not be surprising, theretore, that tbe purpose of the pre.ent tbesis i8 to

oa~

inv.stigatlon ot Iant's suppositlons.

on a little of tnl.
Thus the tblsis w1ll at-

tempt, in partloular, to explain and to evaluate two of the
basic reasonl whloh led Immanuel ltant to consider bt8 !. prior!
torma .s OeOeI8&1'1_

The two basl0 reasons to be treated he"

are his divislon ot judgment. and his negl••' of abstractIon al
manttested by his po.lting the ·Copernloan Revolution."
The are. of this inveltigation is limited to the
Pretaces and Introduction to Kant's Oritlque,

.!! Pure aeasog_

Kant's seoon4 edition 11 oholen beoau.e It embodies hi. own
addltlona, alterationl, and 01118.1008.

Moreover, the thr••

Engllsh translatore have u.ed this .41tloo.... t.o of the. baslng
their entire work upon it.

ot J. D.

If• •e1kl.john,

Of the Englleh tranelat10nl, that

a8 pr1nt.4 1n the E't'.r7MU1's Llbra1"1

ed1tlon, New York, 1966, has been sel.cted b.cause of it.
tide11ty to lant, Its readablllt7, and Its wld.
tbrough this modern .di tlon.

aoc.eslbill~

In the Introduotion to thil edi-

tlon A. D. L1ndea,. disculsel the relative value ot Kant fS two
.41 t10na.

!he pre •• nt thelis II1gbt bave be.n baSH on any ot

the thr.e English Translation. without aOJ slgnlfioant chaage. 6
6 The varylng merlts of these Inglish translatlons ot
Kant are taken up by I. X. SDdth in hls translatlon of tbe

,
What type ot approach shall be made in this oonslderation ot lant's div1aion ot judgments and negleot of abstraction?
The psyohological approach aeems .ell suited to this purpose.
Thus in the flrst part, the philosophioal thougbt and examples
that set the stas- tor Kant shall be propounded, along with a
study of ltant billl8eU before he solvea the problem tbat oonfronted him.

In the second part ot the tbe.i., an attempt shall

be made to und.r.tand exaotly what Kant meant by the pbra.e
"synthetic Judgments I.' Rrtorl,· and by tbe reasonJ he adduces to
show tbe neoelsi ty of his !. :.erior; torm..

The tbird and last

division containa the oritlcal part ot the thells wblch aima at

anawering Whether Kant's

~

pr12r1 forms are striot11 nece.sary

or even reasonably adapted to a theory of cognition.
The last subjeot of these introduotoX'y remarks i. the
method to be used 1n pursuing the objectlve ot this tbesll.
S1nce three main elementl in this 1nveltigation of Kantfa suppes1 tiona will bel

the exposition of what Kant baa sald on the

problem, the analysis ot wbat Kant meant, and tinally, the critiolsm

01'

hi s reasons for the solution, a few words on the method

used with eaoh of tbese elements s.ems appropriate.

Critisue ot Pure Reason, London, 1929, v. Moreover, in order to
dIscover liiW LiItlii. lpatoh-work lt theOl'7 atfeota Kant'l Pretaoes
and Introduct10n, ct. H. It. Smlth, A commentaFe to Kant.,
.critiju. of Pure Reason,' London, rV!tS, !t:I~
"3. 'aton"
attemp' at"'fi.ifrns eEla theory 1s oontained 1n hi. Kant "
MetaRBIsio of .,rlenee, He. 'YW,'k, 1936, I, 3'7-43. ,au,...
references
!nIB fIrst vol

-r.

are

8

Regarding the expos1tion ot !aftt, both Norman !amp
~

Smith 1n his

OOIU1'l18l1U!7

!2. Ksnt

t. 'Pn

.e! f!!Jte H.,on l
Ie! Po&nt .!t DiEart !!. 11.
t1 QS1

and Fr. Joeeph 14ar'chal, S.

J.,

M!taW"SM have made

pert1nent ltat&_nt..

N. it. Smith

8011e

1n hi.

For example,

e"1a that

cttation or .10816 passage. 18 quite lnoonolullve. lot
onl.J'
all _. relevant pa••as•• be oollated. ihQ'
_at be Interpreted in the l1sht ot an b1ltor1cal W1dez-ataarU.ras ot the yaztioua .tas.. in ltaDt t • de'9'8lo~nt.
flee DlUat alae be prepare4 to tlnd that on certain _in
que,tioJ'll 1taIlt be,ltate. beh.en oppo," p081tlolll, ad
that be noWhaN det1nitelY eOJllR1tl h1. . elt to
quite
tinal e;apreaalon or vi...'

_I'

aD,.

a.ltd., multiple oltat1oae, wheNYe it 11

~'lib1e,

the lnve.t1-

gator muat exerola. pat1enoe 1t be talla to tind oonolu.l.o ana.er..

IaDt _,. quite .1mp17 not bave tormed an,. oomp1etol,.

.atl.tactorJ aD•••r.

'1'.

t.

Mar'cbal t.ll. tboae interested in Jtallt1an .tud1.,

to avold two eatn... 1n the1..- "IUII18. ot Kant

thought. 8 !he

one eatr_ 1.a to wr1te a Yfi'I!'I brlet, clear, and attnctl..
matlon.
11_1,.

Tb8 ahor'ooming. ot thi. approach are tbat 1 t 18
'0

be

lION

'u.-

"I.""

of IUl ln8uttlclentl,. guaranteed 1rlteZ'Ps-etatlO1l

thaD a taithful ~8_ ad tbat lt 11111 baYe alteH. ese •• elvel,.
th. Vue hi,torloal obaraoter ot 1aD"e wr1t1nse.

7

Smltb.,

,,_tau.

The obI'

uiv.

,
8 Joeeph 1IaJ.'6cbal, S. J •• ldl Point de 2~f.t
~.ta2!\1alg,uo, trolaie. ad1t1on, Parla, lR:&, nI,~ r

.a.t. la

9

extreme is to launch out upon a very .labol"lLte, detal1ed, and
complicated OPUS on Kant.

Evidenoing this extreme are

Vaihing.rla long, uncompleted work and the three thick tom•• ot

Vleeachauwer.

It the present the.ia incline. more to the tirst

extreme, let the limitations of the author, of time, and ot

theaia regulations b. sought a8 an explanation.
When the pttoblem of anal,.aing Itant t a meaning ari,ea,
there a.companies it the following question whioh demands a
sincere ana.er:

Is it possible to find tcant',

with certltude' even with high probabl1it,.,

Kant

mar

b. tairl,. clear.

1!! facto meaning

Some doctrines of

Yet other. bave reoelved gra •• l,-

divergent Interpretations trom hi. most capable, or at l.ast hi.
mos t r.nowned, commentator..

Ordlnari17, even a con,oientlou,l,.

objectlve interpretation ot Kant ia onl,. probabl..

Theretore,

any critlcl,. based on auch an interpretatlon can cla1m no more
than probabl1lt,..
For the lake ot aimpllclt,.. dire.t interpretation ot

Kant .e.ms preterable, .inoe tor almost anf 1nt.rpretation derived rpom •• condaI7 source. opposing v1ews oan be round.

Can.....

quentlJ, In so tar as it 1. po,slbl., the u,e ot aeoondal"7
souro.a ln tbl, th •• la will be 11111 ted to a oonflrnatlon of the
direot int.rpr.tation ot IAnt.

When, tinally, cona1deratlon 1. given to the method ot
crltloi.m to be emplo,-ed in tM, the.ll, one tinds the two po•• l-

10

bilities of' intrinsic and extrInsic criticism.

In the intrinsic

critioism--as the phrase 1. understood bere--the norm uled is the

Thu.

author's consistency and hts effioacy in attaining his end.
Kant's statements and arguments would be judged according to
those two po1nts.

Extrinsio criticism oonsist. either in taking a norm
that 1s known to be valid or 10 establishing one if' it 1s deemed
necessary t and then comparing the doctrine of Kant to this

n01"Jl.

Chapter three will be composed of both types of criticism.
An alternate method of extrinsic criticism 1s usual17

not very satisfactory.

It consiats in collating all the testl-

monials against Kant on a certain point or in assembling all the

zeal! on another.

The only means of' insuring 80meth!ng 11k.

objectivity in this &masling ot approval tor a oertain ldea
would be to note down seduoual,. the purpose ot each contributing
critic betore quoting bim.

This would, quIte obviou_17, onl,.

add to the oompleX! ty ot the task.

It, tor example, variou.

quotations from the critical parts ot N. K. Smith, H. J. Paton,
and Edward CairCl were adduced, it could eas11y be s ••n that the

first aims at show1ng Kant

al

a phenomenologut, the seoond at

saving Kant no ... tter what the cost, aDd the last at point1ng
out that ideal1sm il the only terminus tor anyone who aoe.pta
Kant'. starting points.

CODsequentl,., in the critical part of

the tnesil, chapter tour, reterences to .econdary source_ will

11
again be used, in as tar as it is possible, for

conti~matorr

purposes, just as they are used in the analytioal part, ohapter
three.

CRAftER II

HISTORICAL AID PERSONAL INFLUENCES ON ltAIT'S PROBLEM

What are the suppositIons that led Kant to affirm tbat
~

Erlor\ toras are necesaary'

To br1ng tbase suppositions to

light 1s the a1m of this present

ebaptel'~

low 1t slow-mot10n studie. are highl,. helptul in bringing to l1ght all the ,faetors contributIng to lome suoee ••ful

ott-

taokle play in a relativel,. impol"ant tootba11 g ... , how muob
more helpful w111 It be to _ a a ",10w-laOtlon Itud,." ot all the
Influence. entering Into tba t aot or tho,e acts ot jUdSMnt 'b7
which Kant

ga~

an ans.er to hl. Inltial question'

chapter, then, will be a slow-motlon ,tud,..
genaral factors wblch dispo.e

ot judgment,

and second,

This second

tirlt, of the

an,. man towards an erroneous act

an application ot th1s stud,. to the

particular cale ot Immanuel Jeant to •• e whether aDJ ot the.e
factors-los1eal or 1110g1cal, personal or traditional-can 'be
discovered in hi. thought, and it so, wbat influence the,. tad
on Kant', proble ••
~

reader"

personal experience and also the univer-

sal experienoe ot men eviaenee that men's judgments frequentl,.

13
are moved more .trongl,. b7 irrational pulls or puahe8 than b7
the atrength ot ah.er 10g10.

pulls or pushe.'

What are some ot these irrational

Probabl,. the tir8t that deservea mention is a

man t I will when 1t 8omehow induc.. the Intelleot to make an

as.ent.

And this can happen in various wa78.

Through his nll

a man can simply tix upon something he wants, something tbat

hi..

pleaae.

When thls lulppena, hia will 18 alread,. dlspo.ed to

pull hia mild to assent because ot the pleasure he has tore-

Or the lrkaomene.s ot auspending judgment and ted1ousl,.

tasted.

wai ting tor mora 11ght on the question _,. goad his w111 on to
demand an,. decision from the intelleot so long as aome deol.10n
is made.

Finall,., a les-man attitude may have habituated hia

will to let the intenect glve far too eaa,. an usent.
Bealdes these Inordinate dlspoaltions of the wl11,
there are other taotors inclining to error.

'l'bere 1s an unrulJ'

iDaaginatlon tbat exaggerates and di.tort. tacts.

Long

rears ot

experlenoe taught '1'ere.a of Avila to brand this te . .ing souroe

ot error a8 "tbe madman of the hou••• "

Moreover, there are a

mants moods and temperament that can make him too eager or too
slUggish In givlng a •• ent.

Again, there 1s that .trollg in-

ollnation to be sceptical towards anything not oontlrmed by
immedlate .. n..

.~perl.noe.

In the lot.11eot It •• lt tbere are man,. oooa.lon. tor
error.

First there 1s the natural 11m1tatlon

or

man', in-

14
tellect.

This taot is attested to mOlt atrongly by tne works of

the truly brilliant men 01' our race.

All the very

dltt.ren~

approaohe. to rea11',. propounded by Plato, Ariltotle, Augultlne,
Aquinas, Descartea, Kant, Hegel, and Berg.on-·to speak on17 of

We.tern thought--are proof ot this natural lim1tation ot man'a
power for knowing rea11t1_
focusing •

ufticl.n~

Again, a judgment oan be made wi thou~

at tentlon on the problem.

Frequent11 error

oreepa into a man's thinking beoau.e he is untaml11ar with tho'e
basl. aoi.nc.s tba t would keep bis thought in line _ An ignorance
01'

metaphysica, of logic, and e.,en of h1stol'1 caD lead to small

errors whlch in the elld grow qulte co.tl,., becau •• all the other
discipline. deper:d on these funcSamental Icience ••
Th. tlnal factor within the tntellect di8posing to

error i. wbat might be called the direotly logical inflUence
tbat leads the mind a,tray_

This embrace. all the mind'. prevlou

judgmentl-thole "pre.judgments" or

tf

pre judice8·--which a,. be

insufficiently grounded but Which are uled nonethel.a. to .upport
realoning.

Obviousl,. all con.equent reasoning can have no great-

er worth than tbe origlnal "prejudice. ttl
Although all the.e posslble interior lource. of error
•• e. diaheart.ning enough to any enthusiastic I.eker for truth,

1 Far a detalled study of tbe nature and operation of
"RreJudlce· ot. John Henry lewman's The Present P08ition of
Cathe>llos' !!l Ensland, London, 1918, B'1.. BI.
-

15
it would be gross carel.lsness to leave unmentioned thoa. ractore
outaide a man which can move him to error.

Such element. are

thoae subtle, irreeiatible things like the apirit ot one'. times,
or the example of othere, or the preJudloes ot one's tellow workers.

Thase move almoat imperceptibly, but with great torce.
Atter this brief aurvey of tne general occasiona of

error, the ground 8eems somewbat prepared tor an applicatIon to
Immanuel limt in ordal'" to di.cover i t anT. and how many, ot
thea. ocoasions may" bave been present dur1ng his serious study

ot the poss1bility of synthetic Judgments

a Eriori.

Fortunately,

there i8 not mueh need of tear1ng a notewortbJ distortion of
Kant • a thinking whioh might have ari8 en trom too playful an
imagInation or trom thoae vacillatIng moods of triumphant dil.
00"8l'J

and wearied trultration.

For Kant was a deep, bard,

patient thinker who was careful to retrace the stepi of hi,
thought. 2
But undoubtedly other 1nfluence. both 10g10al and non10g1cal were tugging at Kant'. mind.

To present the reader with

a clear all-embracing v1ew of' theae lnau.ncea, firat they' wlU

be merely catalogued, and tben a more detailed atudy ot each in-

tluence w111 tollow.

Dur.t.ng the detailed study of the.e 1nflu-

Also cf.
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(1) that

ences an attempt will be made to point out two things:

this influence actually affected Kant's thinking, and (2) in what
direction it tended to turn that thinking.
The

historioaland personal influences upon lant"

decision regarding the necessity or

A priori

into non-logical and loginal influences.

forms may be divided

-

Some of the non-logical

influences came from wi thout and some from within, that is, some
of his own oharaoter traits.

Thole non-).ogica,l influence. from

without can be divided into the spirit of Kant's times, which
consisted ot libera11.m. laioism, soientism, and pietism, and
into the example of Kant's predecessors.
British moralists, and especially Hume.

the rationalist., tbe
The non-logioal intlu-

ence. working from within were his own genius, hie exalted e.t.e.
of his own accomplishments, hi. impatienoe with oontradiotions,
his carelessness wi th terminology, and his lack ot familial"it)"
with much of the b1ator,y of philosophy.
On

the other hand there were three

~o~lcal

influenoe.

already accepted by Kant and thus direoting his reflection during his search for the

h2! of synthetic ju4gment s !. prior1. one

ot tha,e 10g1cal influence, bad been tashioned
celsora.

by

Kant"

prede.

Thia flpre-judgment" had certain oocasions and proroqui-

sit. condition. which dispo.ed his predece.sors' minda toward
thia universally held conclusion.

The oommon oco&s10n, were

found in Occam's nominalism and Deacarte.'. subjeotivism.

one or

17
the prerequisite oonditions was an excessive diohotomy between

soul and bodl, whioh the oontinental rationalists took

c~e

ot

empbasizing, while the stress of the B:rt1tlsh &mp1rloists tell on
the til:l%'e.e

following ootldltlons t

(1) a

s,oparatlon of :::ooidents

trom substanoe, beoause in tbe knowing prooess man reaohes the
(~~)

appearancos, not the real substan<Ht;

the atom1e,

'1leorz

of

sensation: all that is known of things 1s a succession of aense
impressions) and (3) _a....oc_:t_d_e_n....~_s

h1d~ ratheXt tbAn

mantras'

~.

sta.nce.
b

•

~om

these oocasions and oond1tions the mental act1vi

ot Kant-, predecessors caueed only one conclusion to

Necesa1t7 and strict universality cannot come

enc..

This was the

·p~3udlce·

~om

tlcrw.

aena••xpe~l.

inher1ted from Kantls predeces.

sora.
On tho other hana the two "prejudices" fashioned by
Kant hi.elt were (1) that Wol:ff1an

me'ap~slcs

was

metaphysics

simp17, aQd (2) that his own oope rnio an Revolution was a valld
h7Pothesl~h

The forogoing 11st does not pretend to be exhaustive.
It doe. plU.-port to be taotual.

A llOl'e detailed studY' of es.eh

intluence must be undertaken now to sholV tbtl

1n the intelleotual contlict that

W&8

pl.

1't that it pla,..a

wac1ng tor

Je~s

inside
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the acuto mind ot Koenlgabersts famed profassor. 3 ~ order ot
this stud,. w111 parallel that ot the tOl."ego1ng 118t.

It 1s almost impossible tor a man to emanoipate hi1'lllelt'

from

t~

spirit of his age, and thus it 1s important to take into

account the pa1't pla7ed by the spirit of the late eighteenth

centlU'7 in .forminG Y..ant'a decision.

back upon suoh a period can
otMl:' agea. 4

A good hlsto:vian looking

oba~aeto~1z&

1t and

eont~ast

1t with

But it 113 01.'111 an attentive, analytical thlnke1T

who oan so 11ft b.1mIelt above his own t1aas and the tUl'moll about

hi. as to be appree1atival1 aware of the subtle MOvcmant, and
tendenoles ot h1s own age.
:~st

Ina tootnote of his Prefaoe to the

edition, Immanuel Kant showed

tive autllytlcal thinker.

~elt

to be suoh an att3n-

An70ne who 1s tardl1.ar with the ele-

menta Qompvis1ng the late eighteenth oentUl'1-those elementua ot

independence, naturalism ott la1oism, solentlam. and plet1~-
will find the first tlu1ee of these elements rathe):' ole8.%'l7

3

ct.

Mar'chal, ~ Point 2l.

D'Rart, III, 10.

"le cont11t a~oula1re du ~ationalisme dogmatiste et de l'emp~
isme v1nt a se jouer flnalement, pendant una t1'en1;&1ne dlannees,
au se1n dlune pena&$ probe et patient., r1goureuse .t 878t'..
a.t1que.

Noue assisterons aux per1petles let plus marquantes de
drame lntelleotuel peu banal, et nous en aaneidereran. enBult.
de trl. pril, 1$ d'nouement. tJ
0&

4: ot. for example, Carlton J. Baye., A Political and
CUltHa1 IiS.sMa ot Modern ~o;, New York, 1935', !, i§! ana
~m- 3, or '!B:onn'aid', ".o~. a'Dltos,;." 445-450.

.
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revealed in Kant's famous footnote.

And it must be ramambered

that Kant approvingly identifies himself with the spirit descr1b

ed in this footnote.

!.b1s faot brings out the actual influence

of these elements upon him..
The last element, pietism, is not too obvious in this
footnote, though there 18 no doubt that Kant was st1"ong17 influenoed both by his pietistio mother and by Dr. Sohultz,S a
preaoher of pietism.
own

ase

The footnote in whioh Kant describes his

tollows.

We very etten hear oomplaints of tho shallowness of
the present age. and of the deoay of profound soience.
But I do not think that tbose which rest upon a .eoure
foundation, suoh as Mathe_tics, Ph,-sioal Soience, eto.,
1n the least deserve tbis reproaoh, but that they rather
maintain thet. ancient tame, and in tbe latter case,
indeed, far surpass It. !be same Would be the case with
the othal' kinds ot cognition, 1.1' theh' principles we1'$
but firmly established. III the abaan•• of this security,
Indlffe~ence, doubt, and t1nall,., severe Ol'lt1a1s. are
rather signa of a profound habit of thought;. OUr ase 1s
the age 01' o1'itic18., to which eve17th1ng muat be subjeoted. The saoredn.as of religion, and the authority ot
legislation, are by many regarded as S1'ounds or exemption
hom the examination of this tribunal. But, if they are
exempted, they beoome the sub jaots 01' just suspioion, a.nd
oannot lay alaim to sinoere respeot, Whioh 1'eason acoords

-------:"".
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1'he

(U,t;&&ln

of soionoe,

the

des,ire

1"01'

01"1 tioal thinking, the

quest to remove all banters 1m;pe<llngp1"Og1'oSS, the longinS to
SGe morality f'lrm17 estub11absd shine out in this pa.ssnse and a

thGmea tl'¥lt "op ttoourl"'lnS Slt:hel' OJq>Uolt17

01'*

between the l1nel

throughout all 01' lWnttl Ct:t&t19UGi_

But 110<(1 Will these totU'l

Gl.~.nt.

'l'hat 1$ tM ob3eot 01" this illVG.1ilp.tlon.

1'1OU1{'1 Kant'. thinkin8

fhaao 8leaants plq

the . a ' Sapol"1;nnt part of 411 the Influence. undergone by Kant.

1'he,.

d.tel'Ddn~

tM ena which. he

.0'. cui to attain b1 hla spec-

ulation, as. wol1 o.sthe f\.'mda.ntnl

~.r

in wih1ch thnt end 11

gotng to be pUJlaued.

It wtu. hi. devo'i.dneae to ,u,lenoe arld his deop de,h'te
fo:t* solid moral livIng that

pUt

Kant upon hi.

(lOUt's..

tt1a end

dw,"I:lne; all hJ.a J'ea»s of th1nldng was to save Qftd proteot bo'h
sclecoe and mol'alli;J--antt .. noble end It

WQ.

The other two

eleMnt. 1D Kant. a elgh'cKulth aontUl'7 $A tmc.pber....lnd.pend.nc.

ana la101.m.-oontrolled

t~

mannor in whloh

laving mc.a1. and sclenoe. Be
thinking.

dl

I

do his

Be would notbofibar ,. depelld

of pb1.1oooph1onl
t 11

~ould

J'

J

exp$r1~no.

beh1t1d

hi..

aD

Kan' would eo about
own

lnd.penden~

tM man,. centU1"le.

Uuc1l leas would he de!". .
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to any supposed l'ount ot revealed truth.

Nor would ho seek his

solution, even in part, from aome intervention of the supernatural.

The light of his own natlve reason was amply sUfficient

to guide him. --With these remarks, the na.tlU'e and influenoe 01'
the temper of Kantts t1m&s seem to be sufficiently sketohed.

Another 1llogical influence that can play upon onels
ndnd is the example Of others.

The oonoreteness, the suggestive

ness, perhaps, even the seeming succ •• s of the living e.x.a.rnple
allures an assent hom the mind tar more eas117 than the thin17
conoatenated ooherenoe ot a prolonged argwaent.
betore him many 8y..amples that drew bis
sOl'ltrthing 11ks !. ar1or! tOnl.S.

mna

And Kant bad

ln the direotion ot

It wl11 be suffioient to mention

th!1ee of these examples.
As Kant sat 1n h1s study, his eye. might eas117 have

fallen on the tomes 01' Le1bnitz, Woltt, and the
is~s.

Eere

W&~e

innate ldeas 10 abundanoe.

otbe~

rational-

Here were men who

had gotten around the diffioulties of cognition by as1nlPle
tea'--at least, so it was reputed.
mind trom the start.

Just

the ideas in the

Then the%'e oould be soarcely MY diffioult,.

in having the mind come to know them.
facile W&7 out of

d.posl~

He%'e seemed to be on.

~tfs p~oblem.

Besides those p%'edeoessors on the Continent there were
many outstanding men in England who had oarved out new paths that
oou.ld be eas,. to tollow.

If one takes into aooount Kant's desae

22

to explain the synthetie judgment !. 21'io1'1 and joins 1t with.
Kantls long aoquaintance with the works of the British MOralist.
like Lord 3battesburr,

~anels

HQtoheson, Joseph Butler, and Ad

Smith, 1t will be readIly seen how the moral Inst1nct, the innat
"moral aenae" ot these men seemed an alluring possibility
the solution Kant was groping tor.

But perhaps the strongest of all the examples lntlueno
ins Kant was that of David BUms.

There are numerous assuranoes

ot this given by Kant himself in both the critlgu!7 and in
ProleS9men~

!! !It

~tHEe

hi.

Meta2hZs12s.e Bume oontinually speaks

of hidden springs and prinoiples ot hum.an nature to explain
universal, neoessary oonooot1008. 9

In the end what could be mol'

close to Kant's ideas ot the categories

a8

synthes1zing torms?

Since the presen' paper does not aim at any exhaustive
analysis of the non-logical influences enter1ng

!l ext£a into

Kant's deoision, this slow-motion study may now tocus upon the
charaoter of Kant himself to

b~1ng

to

l~t

the predispos1tions

within the man Which may have inclined hia one way or another to

Dr. Paul

7

ct.

S

Kant~

CQ1'US,

~.,

27, 35.

P1'ol.somena to .!:E.I. ,FUture Meta2hls1o!l, .d.

Chicago,

10!!,

!:lcr;-l~,

ft.

9 Ct. Dav1d Hums, An ~u1r'Y Conce!'slns !!ge!n understasdius, Chioago, 1935, 43, ~ a
,~
,
•
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fix his assent oonoerning the Jlacessit:y of !. 122:'&21"1 torms of
understanding.
A glanoe at Kant laboring ceaselessl)" and w1th almost
olock-like regular1ty on a problem that the majorit,. Of men D.l'e
not eVGn aware

or #

Ilnd a pondeI"ing gaze that follows :rum as ,-ear

after rear be perseveres in his toll and masterfully maintains a
high

inte:rest in lUs problem, olearly reveal.

,,,1 thout

much possi-

bility of doubt that here is fts. powerful and penet1"atlng intel-

lect struggling and twisting r6100t1e8.1,. towards 1ts goal.ft10
Here 1s an intellectual giant ot the

t~st

order_

Over and

above that native brilliance and P8l'spicaoit,. charaoteristic of
this Ddndthere are many intelleotual virtues that would help to
ward otf

et"ro~.

auah virtues were Kant's unquestionable sincer-

1 t 7, great patienoe, and untiring perseveranoe.

Kant's 1s,

indeed, as In.'. lrau."'chal put. it. nune pens'e probe 41'11 patient.,

l'igoureuae et s7stematique • • • une g'n1e oonscienoieux e'
pl'esque entl~ement sympatlque. 811
But 1t must be kept in mind that e.rtl'emes usual1,.

entail some danger., and thus tor Kant there was the dangelJ of

an exalted esteem of his own intellectual endo"hts and acoom-

plishments.
10

There 18, indeed, some evidence tor believing Kant
Paton,

~ntfs

Mstap8lsio Sf EePerlenoe, 56.

11 filareohal, ~ Point 2.!.Depart, III, 10 ana 17.
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sucoumbed to thla <lansex-.

He doee

0Qe. 3:1UlS aorOS8 p~UIStlG•• 1n

Graatnees ot Me s.olUeveJaal'lta. la
the Cr&t:1Sit
j

01'*

vat'y :n:-equentl,. to the

l'Gtol'

Plro.eiomal! that a.re l"e4clO'l'lt of' an

OWl'WGOn1ns

Bolt-ootli'lden•••

.r:;Y.,n 1f rant bad
not bayS been in

~n7

be~n

\11th

a :U"tel'uj man, h1a style \l'ould
Sl'Gllt German w:rlte.ra of hi.

tb$

period l.J.k0 a.b!11er and lIe1ne.

But 8ince YlADt was

D.

,r<oi'essw

nnd

Q.

ph1losQphor, lx-om whom olutltr and lIbaclut$ objeotivity

@6

expeoted. one oannot pass overw1thout mantloQ tho••

pt"l.

sose. of Kant tb$t ••em tln'!J$d \fluh a certa1n braggadooio. 1,..
1.Tono:l1%llflU,

Button, tU17sthat style 18 the

that his diotwn 1.

thO dOGS ~nt Dill'J1t

l!IlEUl. and

to the exten'

to Oenote4 as ovorlr'

oonf1dent in hia own 4b111'1•••13
Mo:n:t 60VOl'i,Somo 01' his bGs....lmowa

o~nttator.

baye

oalled itD.nt to taalit i~01" tb1a. 14 OOl'l$tJquentlJ, suff101on1i
'1'1

tnll Til

q

•

justl::'loatlon aeoms at band to noto down (1 aoroo\il1hat high esteem

of bls awn lntol1eotunl
al'teotlng

p~owess

as one of tho dispositions

thou,oht. RenllstloGll1 oonnldeNa, few thinsa

l~'Ul'b's

vlOuld havo been more (1Utleulb to'/! I(ant
~

selt-esieam.

tt

llIUl1i

~.ntellcotual .p~lne

not; haw tal1ed to

be

"~l'ed

that

th18 h18h

an_ "Sal'S

ot

in and a:round the U'nlveralt7, Kant oould

,..a(u)r:Jll~e

Gon with that ot tM

1;0 a'l01<.1 tbtw

111& e>q manto.l ata:tnnt • in ocaparl-

oon'.~o._les

1I1'h whom ht l!.ved, wo.ke4,

a.nd cotrf'(ll*sed.

'!he poaa1bl_ lntl11&nce

needs

ot

suoh

a o181'oIl11i10n sORl"Oe1J

It oouldeas111 'and to __ Kant

o~nt.

~r.... aUJl'e

ot

1118 own oonolU110D1, 01' a-oluotan' to _ _ 111vo8t18a1;10n8 ttJ.Jt

baok into the hia1u4.,. of ph110.oplq',

OJ'

"von 1rked and d1l0OD.-

Oelf ' " tJb$n tbs stubbol'n oon~~dl(rtl(;na 01' tho HtlQtUl.lu1s

would no' 71eld to tho
t.rh18 :Laat

of his

tho~'.

namea • .trect, an

diotioM, oalls .cOl' n
Ma~eobal

PO\'l~

tno~e

~tleno.

Cltpl101t iPOatmfU\t.

w1 th contft-

III taot, Ett.

potnts out Ran'-. ditficult!es w1th the antlnotd.es,

¥lh,lob lCont oonoidered as

1n~Bnt

oontl'Atu'ct1ons in WlJ' der.1n1te

metaph,sioa, aa the real

.t~tins

1:>o1nt tl-om \lhl0h tlow$d the

neo.llst_o,r !. Pul'tl9£& to. . .15 It 1s
U

I

I

I

j

tN. that EArl't

was h1gblJ
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sensit1ve to the many contrad1otions whioh bis keen mind oould
spy in the arguments of
~

And in their

Ube ratlo~a1i8ts.

ext~emalr

Erier1 view of things and their not too suocessful attempt at

explaining GodJs

f~eedom,

the true nature of sln, and many other

Cartesian diffioultles, Kant may well have been justified when be
treated with disgust the oontrad10tory statements of th& rationa11st; •• 16
However, it takes a.n extremely patient; mind to _ke

sure. first, that certain dootrines are truly

and

contradiot~,

then, to push on to distinguish between the rea.l1,. exIsting 'h1ng
spoken of 1n the dootr1De, and the

doot~1ne

reason does not contol'm to the rea11ty_

ltselt whioh for some

Frequently lt 1s dltfl-

oult to find the ambigu1t,. of terma or the dlfterenoe of aspeot
involved.

And it Kant has not taken tbB utmoat oare in this re-

gard, surety soma of the consequent error oan be
the oircumstanoes in whioh he was en.Rhed.

att~1buted

to

For tew men haTe

eyer been so oompletel,. caught and sUl'l'ounded by the prongs of a

ph1losophioal "pincers moYement" as was Kant17_-and both pinoers
had stemmed out of' those unbalanced half-truths ot Desoartes.
Is thaI'S, perhaps some reason that might explain, &11

antinomies of pure roason which awakened him from his dogmatio
slumber.
16

Cf. for s:r..s.mple, the Crit1que, 1, 11, 13, 36.

17 Ct. Mareohal, .!!. Point

~

D6m;rt, V, 4:.
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or

least in part, Kant.s inability to work his way out

these

antinomies, save by having recourse to bis distinct10n between
J2henoJ16Q! and no'Ull1en"a?

A.lmost ever,. .-ead.x- of the

9rltlqu~

oom-

plains of tbe obscurity of Kant's thought and the multiple meanings of the various torms.

Surely nothing oould

1101'S s~r1oU817

hinder Kant's disoerning a differenoe of aspect or an ambiguous
use of tsPma in a 8uPPoled oontradlotlon than a oertain obsourit
and contusion about the meaning and use of baai' definitions.

The point of this pre.ent problem 18 not the actual

presence of major

cont~adictlon8

1n Kant.s crltliue.

enoUih %tau int$%' ,sohotas on tbat question.

Thers are

But the i.sua at

hand 1s, dHS ltant ha...e the habit of som.et1m&s Using "'.1'7 basic

wOl'ds in a

1008a

ambigu1 t 7f

non-scientlfio mann.er or even wlth a oonfusing

It 1s not necesaulrl17 a weakness or a. tault to em-

plo7 one werd in man7 dUt.rent meaning. provided the mean1ng.

a.

aJte kept in line and the Gontex' suffioien1;l,. ind10ate. the
desired mea.1nth
ax.8.JGPle.

at.

~o_.

Aquinas adght be 01ted M1"e

aD

In general na1tb.er friend nor toe of the Angello

Docter bJtands him as an ob.curRntiat though be does use words
Buoh aslntelle!,tu8, "at10, ~.ub~eo~•• 2oiient.1a. etc •• in man7
d1rr.~ant

senaes.
The answer to the present question 113 that Kantioften

did not keep sufficiently distinct the various meanlngs he
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attached to a word.

Te~

11ke experlence,18 judgment and

8ynthesia.19 oategory or torm,20 a~e often not employed preoise17

enough tor a soientific

t~eatmen'.

EVen H. J. Paton, who alma at

saving Kant whe:t*evel' possible sa7., "I do not defend theae ca:t*elessneseea ot expresaion, nor do I maintain that the oontradio.
t10na are alwarB marelr verbal ••• w21

Thus, the evidence

in one'. own oonscientious

gath~.d

stud,. ot Kant and the weiSht Of so

maar

authorlties point direct-

17 to Kantts insuff10ient pl'eolaion and oare in the ue ot terml
as maJ or reason. wh7 Kant t s ma.n'1 ant 1nOJdes X'emainea lIxuu)lvea.

There 1s no need to point out tlteconsequences of this carelesanesl wlth words, tho •• 1mportant "oltadels ot thought."
A study ot Kant"

obsourltr mar lead this investigation

to a fifth charaoteri.t1. ot Kant's thInking,
doubted17 accounts

ve~

that un-

much tor hIs peoullar use of terms aDd

hill rather nat.,.e bellet that he was i;he fUteiJ

suoh unchartered proble.. of the m1nd.

1s

a.tao'o~

t~ v~nt1U'e

Into

This fifth charaoteristio

Kant'. extremelJ SlIght aoquaintanoe w1th

the Whole

hl8t~

18 Ct. Calrd, Critical Phl1oS02&, I, 237.
19 Ct. P. CoftO'1, !Rlste91og, New York, 1917, I
168-175 and 200.

20

ot.

.Ubenes,
.

H1!ltorl 9.!

l!hl~Q.o12hl,

II, 1M

21 Ct. Paton, ~Bt'a ~etaiAi8ic !! ~r1enoe, 51.
Mer.ove", Sudth, commenta"i' xx. sar8: 1:s a wr- er, hi {ianil
1s the least exaol of 13.11 he great thlnk9ra."

of
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philosophy.

And 1£

the sp1x-1t of his times 1s

cons1de~ed,

a

disdain toXt the Middle Ages or to'%' anything somewhat Catholic 1n
tone, along w1th an exolusive interest in the "enlightened"
period, 1s eas117 underatood. 22 Alnple referenoes m1ght be made
to

this~1snoranoe

01'

two examples taken from the Or11;198e 1tself are necess&U7 t.

of previous philosophioal endeavDr,23 but one

bring this out JnCnle olelU'17.
Regarding his question, "Are synthetio judgments A

1'1'101'1: poss1ble?ft Kant tells

'WI

1n the Prolegomepa that "The

principal reason 1t was not made long aso 1s that the question
never ooow:-red to an1'bod1."24

It ma7 well be true that knt

tast used the PB.%'tloulaP phrase, "synthetI0 judgments !. Jal"lo:r1, If

but 1t 1s onl)" an unfamiliarity with Aristotle, with Aquinas and
-the othel' Middle Age dootol's that could leave h1Ja with the i~

pres. ion that he was the til'st to investigate this 1Jype O:f
judgment. It Kant had read, top instanoe, the 8&00nO book oZ St.

, Thomas t 8 Conunentaa; .!?Jl J!!lt ~taP&Sie8 .!! Al"i.tot,., he would

not have ventured such a .tate-.n1;.25
Anotbel' instance ot Kantts ignora.nce of the histo1'7 of
•

as

Of.

23

From the

24

Ka1'lV, P,role"2~na., 27.

25

Aquinas,

follow1na 10c1:

Ca.1N. ,C:r1t,cal Ph1loaoJZ&, I, 69.70.

PtT02:elo_;
alone
~, 93.

3. 27, §!,'l,

lB.

can be oited

II Met., 1, nn. 275..297.

the

30

philosophy occurs when he speaks

or

the ontologioal argument

rot!

the existence of God 1n the Crltliue. Be saJa
Ph11olophe~8 have always talked of an absolute!l
neoeSSaJ!'lbe1n g , and have nevertheless declIned tio t;ake
£HS irau Ie ot oonceiving, whether--and how--a belng o~
this natve 1s even oogitable, not tQ mention that 1ts
exls'~Qo. 1s actually demonstrable. 26

Kant would not have had to penetrate even into the ohlef work ot

Aquinas to tind himself contradicted.

the

Summa

It he had merel7 soanned

TheeloSioats table of oontents, or its equivalent, be

would have discovered that Ohapter Twelve ot the first book was
entitled, S,uSmod,R De,¥, !. o,?bls c0i!!0scl turf, while even ear...

lier ,27 Kant t s eyes would have rested on the words, UtrUlfl :qeW!!
esse

!1!. d,.monstr,bil;e', where

Aquinas's attamati.... alu,ny.l'

meana that God ;1s s\U'elJ "oogitable .. " as Kant puts it.

MoreOVer, 1n St. Thomasts famous thirteenth chapter
Nondnlbu,~

Dei." he elaborates the ana-

ha.... of God.

It should be boS'n. 1n mind I:

ot the ..til'st book, "!2,!.
logous knowledge we .

too, that we are looldng at on17. one. Of Aquinas's works.

had also taken up the cOlnosolb111ty or God in the SB!!!

Cont~a

Gentiles, in h1s

Co~ntarl

in othe x' worb.

M.o1"eovel'l besides Aquinas I: there wera mao7

othe~

£nleter

~!~a~d~£

Be

BeRtone.s, and

dootors and philosophers ot the "pre-enlightened- da7s-26

Kant, Crltlgue, 347.

27 Aquinas,

1- lB-,

I, 2, 2.
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such as Albert the Great, Dun,Scotus, Bonaventure, and Suarez-V/ho definitely had not "declined

to' take tho trouble of conceiv-

ing" this particular problem.
Examples suoh as these might be increased by twenty

or tlnrtYJ but again the evidence seen in a private reading of
Kantts

crl~1qU$

joined with tnese forogoing samples. points

dec1dedlr to too small an aoque,lntanee with philosophical though
before the "enlightenment."

The possible intlueftoe of' sueh

ignoranoe 1s man!!'.st.

This brings to a olose the pl'esent investigat10n

or

the non-log1oal influenoes a.tleeting Kant hom w! th1n and 1\'om
without.

From wIthout Kant absorbed the spbtit of his age.

He

wanted to be an independent 'Mnleer and criti0 largely beoQuae
of the llberalism and la1c1sm that tilled his de,.8.

Becauea 01

the sueces8 of s.lenee aad thB spread of pletlsm. be set his

8,.

on the noble goal of saving and prote.tins both aolenoe and
m.ox-al..
\lfere

Bes1de. this spit'lt of the "enUghtened a.ge, It thel'.

the examples of the rQtionalists wlth their lnnate idea.,

ot the BrItish MOl-all". with thoU- "moral in.tinot, It a.na
espeo1a111 of

Dav~d

H'WISe with hia h1dden springs and pl'inelple8

working unnoticed deep down

in human natU)'te.

All of them weX-8 a

least road-ma.rka pointIng 1n tbe dbaOtlon of !.

RJ"lo~1

r...,..

Prom wlthin, Kant was dlsposed and oonditioned by hi.

own sin•••8 and persevering thOUght that proceeded

~om

a tru17

:S2

gifted mind, by a oonsequent esteem ot his own work, by a certain
impatience in the face ot real or seeming oontradiotions, by a
oarelessness in his use of tsma, and flnally, by an unfamiliarity with the hlsto:t:')' ot

ph1lo.op~.

Now that the dispositions in Kant'. intelleot and in
his other faoulties have been examined--h1s desires, h1s blind
spots, his 1ntelleotual temptations, his natu.al drift in viewing
problems,--now, the living thought, the aotual philosophical

dootrinGs which his predeoessors and Kant himself fashioned, may
be deposited oaretull,. Itrto thIs ndnd, and the reaotion observed.
This _ans a hi.tox-Loal study of what will be oalled the logical
influences upon Kant, an e7..amination of some ot these presuppositions and "prejudioes lt whioh, once aooepted, logioally pre-

determined Kakl1;'s S91ut1un of the problem.
It is an adndtted 1'ao,28 tbat one of the most fUnds..

rnen1ial suppositions in Kant's C,r1tique 18 the dootrlne

tba~

absolute universality and nec.ssl t:y do not come trOlll exper:1eno •• 29 No d1st1nctlons are made regardlng this supposition.

iA>.rweg, 111storl ~.
and 161, wSere Be calls this supposItIon ~tts
"trfW-/"Dr' ~t.icloJ' J Mareohal, La Po I t de DiJaart, III, 52; F. X.
Caloagno, S. J., PllUosoREl'a ~)J ol.utIca, laples, 193', I, 194,
Benisnus, Brother, 1'. lJ. ~., mit: Ul'l"o.~edte, and God,
Milwaukee, 194'1, 346, and Cot!• .,., !p1. emokoJ, tm1.28

Cf. Smith, COnmteat.~. 56,

PhitOSO~~, 155

29 Cf.
32, 80, and 81.

C.rlt1i~e,

26, 27, 31 and 32J cf.

~olesomena,

r
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1'h.U8 the question immediately vise., how Sl.d whero did Kant

th.1a botlon?
p~i.ld

sa'

Bot_e an anawor oan ba given, a Slano. should 'M

to the "uRal ph1J,osoph1eal ' ••nd8 bet.,e Kilni;'

~. an

etto»' w111 ba _ae to point out the oooulcna tha' ott."ed Kant
an oppertun!', 1:10 _ke this 81.11'p••11i101\. A:tiiet- 'Ms, the various
ovndl1;1,ctls w111

'b$

revealed which were n••d.cJ r.- 'bls supposi-

tlon and ".re fuhion••
:f)tlltllh .mph-1e18',..

br

the Ocmtinen'al t-at101"lal1a'ba and the

t1l'*d.7 establish-

'l!lo •• oondltloQI were 8.

ed bet01:'G Kant., ent..,

~cn

the pb11oloph1oal 800ne, that all

subsequent thlnldne would natual17 b. dlapQ8$4 ••

thiB one

ptU!J'1ou~

~1"

..,

oono1\18108, ne•••• i1,- an4 al$oln'. un!.-·

"alltr do not 00_ fttOJl IGne• •,xpol'ienoe.

a-.

lUff.halt. wlet

.~tlon

ot tlw ,.n_a1 philOS-

ophioal otu"Jtents bittef.it btl' h ottered beN ln tl'aulA'lon as ..
backgl-CUDd a"4ine. wMoh ,. Tlew Kant.
ltQnt bad 141a P1'$4.c••ao~a. We rul,," alreadJ' studle'
the efrol'tla' a 01'1t10a1 theor,of oopltlon attempM4
117 rational!..'. 11M. n.eoar1;•• and Lelbnlta, or 1JJ
8mpUlo1s1a. l1.ke Loe1m arIa Httme. fhoJ.xt an'.en weI~e moomplote qd ene-aided but at lou' bad 'benetit.... 1'111108o~,.~l clearing ott tlw t.wain and tq pOlnt1ns outl.

~th!8 :an;~a:~r~n;a;}u::~

=.

d:nt:l~ ::n;:~~:tt;n.

I'

Descal"'ttea .ttoo'1,..,11 oa11" attention to the poaslbl.
a.'lvl'1 oj;' the. Ble 1n. the lmow1ns proco,. Lelbnltai to
tbedrnamla. of tibe tn'ellisonOl in to~ns the tnt. 1181bhobj••,. Locke and HUM, to tbe ~obab1Ut7 of
inl'!a_ ideas a.nd tI. the <llfts-Gulta. tblt
$'V¥1117

H,.,

ontolos11t10 ,...oau...
nut tbe.... influenoe dld not atop lies-e. l'r.anfl"

9.t"1_ was to a 0."&1n e,nen' pped.'end.ne4 "7 tdw
/~~\SToW~~
t'-t'+!"
\

LOYD LA

UNIVERSITY

W)
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oonoret. terms of the problem which was already 17in8
on the table for his examine. tion. It has already been
shown • • • how the natural development ot modern ph11osophJ, starting trom Oocam, bad driven his doctrine baok
into two extreme pOsitlon .......we almos1f said, into two
horns ot a dilemma. T,bsre wa. phenomenal empiricism
(l!UIle) on one sldo and rationallsti. dopatlsm on the
othel' either 1n lUOnlst10 tON (.Splnoza) or plurallstl.
(Woltf). Fl'om eltbbr of the.e two positions the path
towards further evolution was blooked: empiriolsm alwSJ8 ended up in the powerlessness of the sceptl0,
wh11e rstiona..llsm was breaking up through internal contradlctlona.30

So lnUCh te a seneral idea of Kant's predeoessors and ot tbe

impasse thought bad rea.bed Whan Kant entered the scen••
Beside. the

lsm,51 there was

o.~od1ng

ano~el'

influenoe of Oocam'. nominal-

cooasion that opened the way tor Kant's

major supposition regarding unlversallty and n8088a1t1 in Judgments_

whioh

It was Descartes'a oyer-emphasia on the sub3eoti.,. Mo1,
d1st~bed

the

nOl'lDAl balanoe in the trad.lt1onal theoX7 of

knowledge and allowed po.t-Ca~eslan philosoph)' to "start

the mind u and then

at1;u~mpt

tl'0111

some sate exit to r&a11",_

Was Kant att'ette4 by this over-emphasis on the s\1'bjeotiYe element in the knowledge equation?

Kant was eleaxa17

1mbued with the Oa1'te.lan attitude 01' s1iart1ng trom the mind'.
own aotlvlt,._

30

This Is well brought out by his basic question,
Mar'chal" ~ Po1gt

!!!. De2art,

III, 10 ..

31 The size of this paper prevents a thorough stud,.
ot Oocam's lntluenoe. The reader is reterred to Mareohal,
La Potn~.~ D$2ar~, I, 215-260.
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which is at bottom loglcal--and with Kant, formally 10g10al.

For him a.ll oonteo1; in the synthetic judgmants .!. 21'10'1.'1 ma7 be
forgotten while his stud,. ls going on.

ever given just in

1~s

However, no judgment ...

torm without an,. matter.

Kant has thUs

lost that r8..118t sense that takes nature as it 1s fO'Wld and
straightforwardly askS "wbat is lt1ft
of

The aot of oognition migh'

its nature necessarily Imp17 two things, the knower and the

thing mown, but tor the thinker on the oontlnem during tba lat

eighteenth oentw:-7 the knower was the onll element tbat oounted.
Ther. are, mPr8oevGl', explioit statements of Kant wrItten 1n the
sa.me spirit. S2

U more evident. 1s datai.red, let 1t be remembett.

$<1 tbat Kant had taken as one ot his starting polntuJ 10 the

Introduction the obvious existance of pUXtel,. !. ;arlor& knowledge.
would be the influenoe of this apr1orlst10

~~t

attitude?

It presuppose. that . . the humI.ln 1nte11eo1; 18 not an

essentially
p~oper ~o

aot.

an

~elat1ye

s~ernal

faculty whose

prope~

obJ.ot 1s

obJeot which determines

so~

toPm

tn. 1ntelleot to

Thus, this attitude excludes tbe ftI_beoome_the..objeot,ft

the "I-exerc1se-the..act1viir1-ot-the-..objact" theolT

psyoholo§.

ot Thomist10

It prepare. tlw wal tor the plt'oblem of the ttbr1dge"

when thelt's mal be no need tor suoh a proble..
removes any emphasiS on the causal!t,. of the
Uu

Final17, 1t
th1n~

known anCl th

36

makes it diffioult to explain ho\fI necessity and strict universality oould p.;sslbly oome from sensible things.

After this glance at the oocasions feB' Kant's basie
supposi t ion, aocount may be taken ot the existence and influenoe

of the vat-1cus "prejudices" which the rationalists and the
emp1ricis'ba...that two-told broodo:f: Descartes-had passed on to

"alar1ft' Kant's hourI of stud,..
The mathemat1call;y

clear d1vis1on VJh10h Descartes had

made between soul and bod,. was 10herited and enhanced by bl.
succeasors on the Oont1nent.

Bet;ween sp1r1t and _tt01' 1iha"e

was a d1chotol'q' that nothing could bridge, and thus a .t'orm1dable
barrier blocked tbe possibility of abstract1on.

~h1s

dootr1ne

of an exeesalve separation between soul and bod7 passed down
through the rational1st Una and wa.s absorbed, to sorae exten' a't
least, h7 Kant. S3 It ls olear that at lea.1; in the more tandl.

iar sect10ns of his wOl'k Kant alway. apeaks of the IH:lnaea, the
under'standing, and the reatton (-willen his intent 1s to contl.'ta.'
them) I as 1t

the

1mpo~tant

1i11.e,. were

units in the_elves.

dlstinct10n between

£acultles as it

tbe,.

n

neoess~i11

_k.

oonoeiving

were substances themselves, and asserting

that the,. aotuallr are so.
F

He does not

37

Although

Y~nt's

Transcendental Ego offers soma basis

of unit,- ,-,hich resembles the soholastic radlcation of distinct
faculties in one ultimate

sou~ce

ot immanent activity, neverthe-

less his noticeable lack ot emphaSis on the dynamic interaction
and interdependenoe of the faoulties when man 1s produoinS one

unified operation is quite in
metaphysios ot his

~ationa11st

acco~d

with the essentialistl0

predeoeaso!'s" and leaves oppor-

tunities for pseudo-diffioulties.
lJ!h1s presupposition of an excesaive dlchotol1lJ tends to
engender problems wbsre none really exist.

Although Kant f a use

ot the sohemata to explain the mediation necessary between senae
and intelleotual oognition will approxlJ11atie the l'homlstl0

Wle

of

the oogitative sense, nevertheless, Kant's exaggerated ohasm
between sensitive and intellectual oognition only oonfirms the
rejeotion of tbe possibility of abstraction by the intelleot
trom senae data.

FOr with this aha••

~e

dlffioulty of inter-

oausality ariaes, as well as the need o£ seeking the total ex.
planation for the

un1Yersall~

and necessity found 1n

~.

eriori

judgments trom the intellect alone.

It the Continental rationalists bad cleft a ohasm botween mind and

matt~,

be'ween the intelligible and the sensible

the British emplrlciata--LOcke, Berkeley. HUme--had cut yet
another chasm, but this time it was not in the knowe)!', but in
the thing

knov~.

As this study now turns to consider the

36
British 10;.:;:1.0&1 horltaaG to Knnt, the three SUP1::ositions

they bequeathed to him may be used as guideposts.

'.~.hich

They were:

the diohotomy between pl'timary and secondary qualities, the
atom1o theoX'y oJ' sensation, and the "h1dden pedestal ft idea ot

substance.
The f1l:tst supposition of the empiriCist school was the

separation in our knowing prooess ot the accidents trom the existing thing in itself, as if these acoidents Wel'e the object
lmown.

It 1s an historical .taot that the germs of this th601'7

were sown by Descartes in h.ts plseours de la Metij.ode. M

He d1 ••

regarded secondary qualities beoause ther Gould not be clearl1
conceived, and affirmed that

eA~ension&nd ~tion

realities in the material world.

were the on17

Looke developed th1. tenet

He mare17 bald to a nominal essence of an unknown

further.
aubst~ate.

Be~kel$y.

who followed, managed to deny the rea11t7

of all -.te1'1a1 objects and made knowledge ot: them depend upon
Godt. putting them into the m1nd.

H\lmfJ to assart was that

~n

Thus, all that remained for

fta.re nothing but a bundle

01'

oolleo-

tion of different pel"oeptions, -.v'hich suoceed eaoh other with an

inconceivable rapld1t7.ft35

Evidence

tOl'

Kant's acceptanoe ot

this theo1'1 is found trequent17 1n the Critlq,ue and in the

H1stotZ

34 Ct. Thonnard, Precis
~ode~n Ph11os02Sl_

£!

35

as.

Hwne, EnguJ.r:;y, 247.

~tHisto1~e,
1'. ~

612,· and

Wr1~ht.
~ ,

59

This emphatio division between aooidents and things-

in-themselves disposed Kant's mind to look to anything but
abstraotion as a possible explanation for his tamous problem on
the relation ot the mind to the thing, which he bad outlined in

his well-known letter to Marous Rerz. 57 Aooording to this
"prejudice" the sensible accidents

manl~ested

in experienoe were

known and told nothing ot the supposed substance beneath. Thus.

,

the propounders ot this theory should. it they wished to be
logical, have spoken of sensing "mDtlon" and not "something mov-

Ins,"

or spying "redness" and not some "red thing."

Kant,

accordIngly, passes by the possibIlity of an objeot ooncretetl
affecting the senses in suoh a way that hare and now the knower
intentionally exist. aooording to \h18 quantity and
various qualities of

thes~

!e!! being and acts out dynamioally all

these determinations.
Kant was also atreated by Bume's "prejudioe" that men
know mere17 a group of sensations rapidly suooeeding eaoh other
36 FDr the cr~t1rue, of. 46-47, 51, 56-57, 60. Cf.
also Paton, Ka~t.s Meta~
C 'ot ~er1eno., 66, for a olear
statement ofnt'. a40ep anoe-of~!s oooVrine on sensible
qualities. For tne Prolesomena. at. 43-44, 58. 99, 109, 133.

is

3' Ct. Sm1th,Commentar" 219-220, for an English
translation ot this letter oated ~ b. 21, 1772.
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and do not know any unaer17ing substance.
suspected from

Y~ntl.

This might easi1.7 be

own oonfession of Humats influenoe upon

hImself. and from the tact that the objecta of Uumata and Kant'a
experienoe are reall,. the sa_.

Thelte 8re,

several

moreove~.

passages in Kant.s works which are s1iamped with this doctr1ne. 38
One example of this dootrine -7 be oited.

in his treatment ot

t~

suooession of tima that

Knnt aa7.

"our

of the manifold ot phenomena is always suooessive.

apprehension

The represen-

tation of parts suooeed one another."SS Such a tenet is intimately bound up with the above mentioned dootr1ne 1n Which tho
accidents are sepa.rated

~om

the substanoe.

The present pre-

supposition onlY' stresses that separation more and lead. to
diffioulties, it in the knowing prooess ..n 11 to be lead by

sense-affeoting aooidents to an intell1g1blesubatanoe.
Another supposition of the British empirioist. that
binders a knowledge ot substance, 1s that the acoidents hide the
realit,. beneath them "ather than manifest it.

1'h1a dootrine waa

popularized among philosophioal ciroles bl Locke with his ·plncushion" 1dea, Dr better, his "invisible pede.tal" oonoeption ot

substance.

When l{ume imbibed this tradition, he forgot about the

substanoe and made the acoidents the "things-known."

of.

38

Kant, C,r1tlque, 144, 146, 157, 200, 436.

39

Kant, qrlt1iue, 149.

Proleso~Ba,

26.

Kant, in
Als.

41
aooepting the dootrine of the aocidental determination in general, aooepted this teaohing, too.40

f.ne thing-in-itself is en-

tirely unknown and impenetrable for the mind.

f.bat tbeae aocidental modifioations might manifest and
eXhibit the insensible natures of things to the intelleot is
another possibility soarcely taken aooount of, sinoe ultimately
its adopt1on would mean the explioit positing of causality from
the thing-in-itself upon
strictl,. spiritual soul.

t~

senses and the actualit7 of a

Kant rejeota here yet another element

that 1s essential to the theory of abstraotion, namely, that a
thing's operations manifest ita manner of existenoe.

Atter seeing Kant's mind oonditioned by all the.e
logical influences of his predeoessors, it is not surprisins to
find him aocepting quite natural17 tbe dootr1ne that stri.' universality and necessity do not oome

~om

sen.e experien06. After

all, was this not the one piece ot undisputed ground oommon to
empirioist and rational1at alike?

For the aake of clarit,., Kant.,

thought under the presaure of uneae 10g1cal influences 1s pre-

sented 1n the tollow1og syllogism. There oan be knowledge onl,.
of what is giveo tormallJ in sense experience, tor the atomio
tbee., of sensation deDanas this.

But natures or easenoes which

are needed tor an,. striotly universal and neoessary knowledge are

not given formally 1n sens.

e~~erience.

Therefore, any strict17

universal and necessary knowledge, whioh derives from nature. or
essenoes, cannot be obtained

~om

experienoe.

In other words,

strict universality and necessity point to a knowledge which has
some other source than sense experienoe.
Besides theae logioal influences tromwithout, there
were at least two other important ideas that helped push Kant"
mind onto the oourse it actual11 took.
mostly ot his own making.

These were supPOSitions

A brief glance at tbese last "preju_

dices" is necessary to reduplicate as closely as possible all the
stage-props and atmosphere that set the scene for Kant's decision.
the first of Kant"

own presuppositions stemmed from

his unfamiliarity with the history ot philosophy.
in too rapid a generalization.

~r

It consl8tea

Kant identitied Wolttlan

metaphfsios with Iletaphysio.s as such. 41 Consequently, Kant
."

41 at. Etienne Gilson! Beins and Some Ph110S2Rhert
Garden City, Kansas, 1949, 112-132, especlalty tID, whire al on
ste a.ka of Wellf's influenoe tm-oughout Europe during Kant t s day:

"To innume~able professors and students of ph11osopbJ, meta.phJs10s was Wolff and what Wolff had sald was metaphysios. TO
Immanuel Kant, in pal'ttioular, it n.~.l' was to be anrthing els6,
so that the whole arltlg.ue of ~ Reuon u.ltimately rests upon
the assumption tbati ine ~an~~ 01 tSe metaphysio. ot Woltt
had been the verY' bankrupto7 of metapqsios. tt
The import ot Gl1son'. WO~d8 1s oonfLrmed and haightened
by the interesting and enlightening oomparison which oao be made .
between Kant.s ren»u'ks on the nature of metapil7sio. (or. C,r1t1S."
3, 6, 11, 15, eto.) and the remarks of Aristotle and Aquinas on
the same subJeot (ot. bk.oC of Aristotle's Me'aPRl8ioa and bk.
II of Aquinas's aommentarzl.
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supposed that in justly putting the S"oord tQ Viol.ftlan motaphysics, he was destroying all

scientific metaph1s1oa.

p~evious

Howavor, the tact that this essent:la11stic Wolffian metaphysios
could not

f~ive

valid explanations of those antinomies whioh put

Kant into such mental throes was no si3n that
lucked an e;tplanation.
exeeseively

~

arlor1 approach, a complete absence
d1sreg~d

o~

analosy in

for the dynamtsm und tele.

RO\'1.cou!d
,= 11; arlfnllor the

the a.ctuality of beiugs.

antinomies?

true ll1$taphyslcs

Welt'Clan meta;>by's1cs suffered from an

the notion ot baing, and a
olo~
it1
~

Do

bl

A noteworthy effect of this identification by

of Wolttun m.etapbfs1cs with metapl:qsiea as such

WflO

y~t

to kelJp

down anT 1nte1"6st or cln"1os1ty in Aristotle'. or Aquinas's works
on metaphJs14s.

The seoond supposlttDn of Kant'. own faShioning was
that 1n the theory of knowledge the oonformity of the mind te
the thing known was rr.s.tter

tor hypothetical oonjecture. Whether

the mind of man ooni'ol'lUS to th:tngsor things conforll to hi. mind

1s not at all evident to Kant.
oan be treated as an hypothesis.

Therefore to);" hilt. either view

This 1s his Whole attitude

when he is explio1tly aettitlg up h1s eo ... oallea Copernican He-

volution. 42 He looka upon his Whole Cr1tig.ue as a. mel".
e.x.par1Juent; to establish the sounder hypothesis.
42 Ot. Critlg,u..e,. 11... 14 "

He tells us,

44,

"Let us the:::: make the experiment whathe!> we may not be more
successful in metaphys1cs_ it we assume that the objects must

oonform to our cogn1t1on."43
One

thir~s

can be seen affectl:Jg the e,nt1re Y..ant1an

philosoph1 as a result of this initial hypothesis.

It is that

the :ri:ant1a.n system in all its :r-amificat1ons possesses no gt-eat.

el" valid! ty "er !!. -than this ste.rting !l7Pothes1.a.
This

to a close the study ot man,. of tho influM

b~ings

enoes wOl'kll".Ig on Kant's mind.
his own fashioning.

Some of' them ws.ra d octl'it'.!es of

Others "161'8 th0 traditional aoctl'inos of

Soma wero log1oal.

his philosophioal tore-tathers.

Other 1nflu

ances were tar more subtle, s.ealing almost unobserved into
Kant ts hours of stud,..

Such were the temper ot bis t1aes, the

example ot othel' thinksr., and

the

power ot his

(JV1n

real geniu-

alons with some of the weaknesses that not inrl'equent17 acoompan

genius.
What was the result

or

this ma•• ot' influenoes?

How

dld Kant reae' to tl:lia "p1nce1"-movament" of ey..oesalve emp1rie1am
and ratlonalis.'

How dld be formulate that reaotion?

did be mean by 1t'

bse

following chapter.

43

~~fl...

12.

a%'0

And what

the quostions to bo treated 1n the

OHAPTER III
THE NA TORE. MEANING, AND PRO 0 F OF KANT I S PROBLEM
Tb$

previous chapter has brought to light

BOttS

historical and personal influences upon Kant's thinking.

of

~.

This

ohapter aims at analysing tbe nature, meaning, and proof of
Kant's or1t1cal problem.
To see olearlr the oentral problem which Kant poses in
his Or1t&g,ue o,f

rure

]1~aaoR

and wh1ch he tb.ere 801ves; at leas1;

to hi. satisfaction, 1t seems best to go t1r$t ot all to tbat
cause which is the most fundamental 1n anr problem, tbe tinal
cause.
Now what was Immanuel Kant tr110g to do in b1a Critics.

Ph1losop1:q! What was his a1m?

Loold.ng at the positIve elements

in his philosophy, one can satelJ sar that at least one of b1s
objeotives, it not the chief one, was the saving of std,ence.

Kant wanted to erect Bome bulwark asalnst tbe scepticis. that
threatened to destr07 soienoe. 1 Moreoyer, morals had to be
strengthened against that quest tor pleasure whioh Kant found
1

Cf. Kant, CrItique, 35.

quite Ifam,pflb'

Ql'O\md

b.1J4.

ne

%latere 1;0 thla p\U;'t,poa. in hi.

Pre.taoa to the _..ond '4)dlt1on whero he aa,.,

fl • • •

abovo all,

it {J;hG O,X*&t.ismij w111 contar en lne ••lmable benefl' on JIOr1l11t,.

and "ollg!on.ft

and "X mwst, tbarer.e, abolish kDowledge to

room tor- beliel'.'"

l~

mutt

80t

bet... h.t.raelt as hi • .tinal

Boal the•• two ai...

to aa". solon. .

1"hus,

cause

th01

beoa_

tbtl

all

0,[,

ant}

to strengthen

Of ~"

ettoru.

_"...18.

b ••

goa1a sa,"" cU••eotlon to h1a th1nking end pel'lM4'. hia 'f'Qrloua

PZ1',liB!.1.
'rlw nexil

.'.p to ho oketn in oomng padua!l,. to a

knowle4ae of th$ 01'1 t10al pst_10m, is to 8M 'fiM "'aolea t.ba1l

mp'

Itl.nt trOll aoh1eVing thel. eM..

• •a the daQS••oua deoay

ol~

In senoral

1m.e.. flbstaol••

"'aPh7elc8 and .,at1onaU_, 1th1ob.

ought to have auPporMd sOianoe, tAlld the .tl'US81q ot oJ:I.PJJ:tlcl_

and the nat....l sol:4mOG. againat tM

4~t;Lo

a ...);'\14.10. of

:ma1iaphJs1oa and l'atlonal.la-.

1!bo Jl$1;aphJal0a

wl~

whioh Kant waa ao,ua1nted ._ eo

s'ban'a., falling into oontl'ad1ct1oJle QJldcould ol'llJ' be aa'f'«td, U

at aU, b7 employing loae :o,eU! !! 1IIl1.18. as Lelbnlta d14 with.
h1a tbeolT of p",.....tabUshed
ft'lt7

11

r

1,....

~& tiQnalu'3 Wei-'.

adept at; te.:.lng down 80_ other AI,.s.ea. but When ,_ £SIt.

ot Cl'1t101•••a.
tu

~ny.

I IJ -'1

I,"" •

11'

,

(UJ,~·$.'e4

at their own ' • •1UI, the lnoonal.1;.

4'1

ancies in their

doet~1nes

points became manifest.

or the arbitrariness of their starting
And woe to the poor ecleotic who trled

to plu.ck plea.sing doctx-inea tX'om. dUt.rent s:ystems'

Antin0DtJ

upon antinomf descended upon his head.
In the opposing oamp the 8l1.P1r1eists
The~

wa~ed

al'tixaongl'1.

simple $11\P1rleist prinoiple had set the l'ampal'ts of ration-

alism 1;otto%'in8, and thus they bad been only too eager to oon....
elude to th8 essential weakness of an:y rational ph1losopbJ.

Tbe

re8u11; was that the su.pposed17 solld speoulatlve toundationsot
the moral order, such as freedom of the will, immol'tallt;r of the

soul, alld the ex1stenee of God, were an1thirlg but close4 questiOns, end eon.equent17, little valid support to" morall ••
Moreove1", the natval .eienc•• seemed to be undu17 re-

stricted in thetr phenomenal development by tbe doctrines of
metaph1sics, the qu.en oS: the s01enoe..

The.. soteno••

1'1.1'.

eVG%' tindins 110re evidenoe \7hieh aee_d to show that aotions 1n
this world were determined b., physical caus •• alone. though

metaphysics kept teaohing the apparentlY incompatible influx of

tre. oQuaal!t, into such a WOl"ld.

The confllot 'betw••n _ta. ...

physic. and the na.t.al aoiencea was

helsh1u~ned

wuen the••

nat_a.1 science. toll owed D•• oart•• IS st".ess on the _oban1.m ln

events, although metaphJs1ca insiated that they oame about tor
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And rei alongslde all this philosophic doubt and tupmoil Kani saw a strange spectaole.
sel'ene as ever.

~hsre

was 10g10, standing

So too, mathematios, untouched bY' these

sceptical storma. was showing progres. day by day_

And recant17

physios had burst into a new glo1'7. thanks to the work ot Newton.
\v-nile

reg~dlng

this speotaole, Kant could not help wondering

wo,

metaphysics alone was 60mB.hed in the coils ot contradiction.
The immediate and most

app~ent

answer was that some-

how a very fundamental mistake had crept into metaph7sic.,

although the other solenoes, perhaps unknowlng17, had hit upon
the t!'ue path to cer1iltude.

To remove this basio

81'1'0"

in meta-

phJslos, something radical had to be done--perhaps not so radical
as an arbitrary ousting ot metapbJslcs trom the field of science,
but at least tnere was need of an exaoting examination of all
the starting poinis used 1n metaphysics.'
Kant took upon himself the task of once and tor all
otU'%'ying out this exacting examination.

In the critical sp1l'1'

oharaoteristic of his age, he could not exercise merely some
hal~-attentive

oont%'ol over the materials that entered into his

3 ~s restriot1on is quIte clearly brought out u".
LindsaJ in his Introduotion to the Everyman Edition of
Kant.s crltlg,»e.2! f.Ure aeasoQ, London, 1946, xi.
A. D.

4:

at.

1iareohal.

is paraphrased here.

Jd!.

r210t .it!. RiRS....

III, 87.89, whioh
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patient so:rutin7 at spaoulation.

Centuries of philosophioal ex-

perience had shown that this trust was too nalve.

Vias 1t no1;

jut thIs spontaneous trust that had brought m.etaplVsIoa into
such decadence'
Thus, while foousing his critioal faoulties upon the

general obstaoles to his purposes, and while oont)!asting this
contUsion and oonflict 1n mataph;rslos with the order and harmon7

present 1n certain

ot~~

aolen••s, Kant discovered

~qO

special

diffioulties ,n.om whioh all this contusion and contliet seemed
to riae.

These wel'e the two problems upon whose solution de-

pended the lite

O!'

death o:t the natl.D'al 80io1106S and metaphJsloa

and, oon.e'luer.rb17, of raora11 t7" also.
O~

d1ffloult,. was the tradl tional bite-ootx' of' tbe

rationallata Who tollowed Descartes.

I£ one started with the

Ideas ln his mind, how eould he eyer be ave the,.
:ttea11

t,.,

thins?

oont'o~d

wl1sb

Bow could there be a bridge bewHn 1118 mind and the

Kant was

aWU$

ot 'his problem. at the beginning ot llls

crltloal stud,-. as his letter to iilarcus Harz

011

.b1,;)brual'7 21,

1772 ass~es ua. 5

,

.

5 Cf. top example,. the 1'ollowing exoerpt ot the welllmown letter as t2:'an81&t80 b7 Smith in his Oommentarz, 220:

We call thus rende1 oomprehensible at least the possibilItY' Olf two kinds ot lntel11gen..... -otan intelleotWl aroh.on whoae intuition the things themsetves' are gx-ounde3,
an ot an 1.ntetleot\UI !~~ "hioh derives the data of' 1. t.
10glcal proc.aure !iom ~e sensuous intuition ot things. B~ 0
1

t5U1,
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The second speoial d1ffioult,., whloh was stl11.

~re

v/eighty, VIas the dl1emma that arose from Kant's ol.inging tio the
rat10nalist prinoiple of ident1ty as the sole norm for soient1fio judgments, and his almost simultaneous abandoning of the
rationalist principle that the real cause of an object and its
suffioient reason are 1dent10al.

Adhering to the l'ationa11st

v1ewpoint, Kant said, nAll our reasoning 1s reduoed to discovering the 1d60tit1 of the pred10ate with the subject elthar con_

s1dered 1n itself' or 1n its conneotion,n S but be parted radically hom rationa.list thinking when he

decl~ed

that tbe definition

of tbe oause of an objeot lDakes it neoesstU'ilr somet,~i[es ~ls.
than t~ objeot. 7 Thus, in propositions that invol.ved a oausal
relation, Kant could not call upon the principle of Identity to

understanding (leaving mo~al ends out ot aocount) 1s not the
CQuse of the obJeot tlu:tough its representations, nor is the
object the cause of its intelleotual representations (!a .'Dall
rea l l). Ren•• the pure ooncepts of une understanding cannot
B.osiraoted tram the data ot the sen••• , nor do thar expre.s ouroapaoitr for reoeiving representations through the senses. But,
whil., they have the1l.t SO\1rces in the nat\U'e of the soul, tbe,.
or1ginate there neither as the result of tine aotion of the
ob3eot upon lt, nor as themselves producing tb$ object.

se

S Immanuel Kant, "Prlncipiorum prlmorum metapbysloae
cogn1tlonls noya dlluoldatl0," Kant's Werke, ed. G. Hartenstein,
Leipzig, 166'1, I, 372. Ms.r~cha! attesis that this Is on, prin.
ciple ot' rationalism wbich Kant never abandoned, ot. Mal-8ohal,
.&!. Point .2!. De;par1i, III, 33, which 1s parapmaased here.
7

Immanuel Kant, "Versuoh den Begrlf'f del' negativen

Grossen in die Weltweishelt einzutUbren," Kant.s Werke, II, 104.
Mar6ch41, Le Point de DOla1"1J,I1I" 33 calls-1;111-a remark of Kant,
nPeu~_itre mime pr6irseeotsivG de la Ph11oaopbie critique."
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explain the connection of subject and predicate.
a real conneotion

the~e

And yet he saw

between the subject and predioate, al-

though he oould not a.nalyze it in the subjeet.

In faot, man,-

the soienoes depended on just suoh causal proposition..

ot

Upon

what basis then Gould the subjeot and predicate be joined in

propositions of this sort!

Kant formulated his dilemma in these

words, ":aegal'dins this ontolog10al l'eason [the ,...ea1 oa.us!j and

its oonnect10n with a. 1'8a1 eonsequenoe, here 1s the question I
a.sk;

How oan we understand that 'Because a oertain thins ex1sts, another thing must exist't- S
Th1s dtle_, oontusedl,. present in Kant's disserta-

tion ot 1755,9 and intenstfied by his own pre-oritioal ponder1ngs, was rendered even more aoute by Kant's aoquaintance10 with

aumet.

questionings upon the pr1noiple of cauaa11t,-.

Since 1t

wa3 not selt-evident tOl' HUme that every event should baYe a
cause, what was tbat

th1~d

something by which ,he synthes1s ot

subject and predicate In the causal pl'inoiple oDuld b., acoomplished?

Kant,

hoJle"~,

did not agree with Hume that this

link1ng sprang fi-om. an inn8)' babi'b i'ol'sed 07 ex.per1enoe,. ainee

e Ibld.
9

Ct.

Mal'oohal,

.&!.

PoiQt

.2.!. peRal't~

III, 33-35.

10 As Smith suggests in his .Q.~ntar{, xxix, this ae
quaintanoe may pel'bapa have been only an indire. one occaSioned
by Kant •• reading ot Beattie t • criticism of Hume.
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this led to soepticism, the destruction ot solence. ll And Kant
always acoepted the well-reputed ex1sting scienoes without ques'tien.

stud,._

He accepted them. us givorl, as .tutios points in his
Motte01'el'. unllke It\lJl1ti), Kant dld 1.10t 11m1t h1s inquiX?

into the nexus for the oausal axiom alone, but extended his Investigation to all those Judgment. of both valid and pl'etent10ua
seienoe, wherein the predicate did not seem contained in the
oontent

.f the subJeot.

What did hi. investigation reveal, and

how did Kant orystallize 1ts findings'
ftl'st, Kant said that even in an unph11oso*cal sta'.

men possessed judgments that .ere independent of experi.no.,12
J\1dgments that dld not tl. the mind down to this partioular t1M

and pla.e.

Po:- example, man knew not only that "KAnt.s house

had been built \),. someone,U-thls was singula:- knowledse ...bU'li
alao that "Whatever happens has a. cause."
was on the un1V8raal plane.

~

latter judpent

Men gave a uniV8l'sal assent to 'h1s

siultem.ent, and m.eant that 1t could be appliea to any and all
happenings.
In addition, men attirmed this judgment and other.
like 1t with strict necosslt7.
cause. It

"Whateve~

happeDS

.us'
have a
•

Kant saw that these Judgmen'. which welte unive~.al and

11 Of. Kant, .9.,1'11;1S\1e, 35.
19

Kant,

Srl~~Q!!' 26.

necessary were absolutely demanded by

th~

sciences.

POl" th$

sCiences were to give msn power oyer the things and events the7
encountered.

Wlthout universal, necessary judgmenta, solenoe

\40u1d become as VEU'iable and lhdted as the experienoe of individual

men.

Men 'Would not be able to re1, at all upon the

applicabl11t;r of solentltlc principles. nor could these prino!..
ConsequentlJ, sClenGeD1Wlt bav. univer-

ples be said to be tru.fIl.
sal, nee.searl judgments.

Seoond17, l"esa.rd1og this W11V$rsal neO$SIUlr7 type of

judgment, which Kant called !. ,,1'101',1 to d iatingulsh it .from judgments derived h-om e.xpellllence,

01'

!.

:2etrb.~lorl

as he .a,..., there

arose the evident need of investigating the following questlon••
~_

Row could the buman mind possess such!. prior! judgments'

wha' pr1nciples did tbls knowledge

sp~ina1

Row muoh of thl.

knowledge was genulne?
Next, Kant 'becan, th1s Inves1;1gat1on of !. ;ex-10r& Judgments.

knowledge 1nto two types.
whioh the pred1ca1J.

\1'&'

Be was .familial' with that type 1ft

contained in the su.bJeot.

ments Kant called anal7tioal
0,",

-

Bie fh'-st slap was oare.t\tll,. to distinguish this a priori.

01'

1'hese judg-

explloative, a !noe the,. ana.l,.zetS

e.xp1aine4 the thougb.t.contant of the su.bjeot-conoept;.

W&s no d1tf1cult,. about these ana1ftlc

Thare

!. pl'iori judpenta.

While percetving their 1mportanoe 10 elar1t71ng solenoe, Kant
alao saw that this wa. Dot the on17 type of !. arlori knowledge.

M

It 1t were the o1'l17

'we, aolonoe oould De"l' ataoOWI' an)'ihina
':roo

Hally new ,for 10th!.

the pred1cat. alwar. e.na'e4 a1-

roadr in tba sUbS••'_
o~r'7pe

1bt

of .! il'&.r£& juds-nt, without wi'11oh

sll0.e CQu14 not OW,, wu the alijjot<ud.a1l1Ve ju4plC1rlia, . .
a~n1;Gd

s:rnthe1Jlo judpGnt, as Kant .a:UAd 1tl. ThU type

thousht-oOQto' of

flub,.",

th$

th8

'0,. adding to it a oompl.tJelf now

p.odJ.o..' . no' tonk10ed 111 the aDJ••'_

.uSe it posslblf!t tar 8cd.e.e· to .'taln

'lb.1a 8,..0'111.0'10 ~

aa 1:n014$4,_.

I' enable<

soleaoe to taake 'Pl',pe•• about 1t. subj••, _"._
1"AI.t; ,pille1;10

ae

tao' tor KAnt.

lenla of •• leu...
••yell

SllC1~n1;.A

l£loE&

eX1atl.d

.t1'. .1e.lI17 addu.oeel EUQuapl••

was ..

iYOl1!1

kIt_

aU the

to11ow1rll weN so_ of hb ape. _ _ •

~

pl. .ft..,. 8qwa18 ' ••lft, a ••~b.'11ne . . . . .n

11 the .her'••', In all

.~loat1on

" ' . po1D1I1

ot mot1on, a.tlon aM

l'o-

aotion . ., alwql 'bGequal, the ....14 . ., have a beg1nn1ns. 1t3
AU thea.

~les ~"

UDiY8ltaa1 and

predioation. And, aoool"d1ns; to

flEHl8Sauy

l~t. tb.ef.~

in theb- _de 0:

pl'edloa'. . . . . no'

oontained a.ll OQvox-t17 in ,he aub3u'b-ooncepl.1a
Bowey_, wl1ih 'his ifPG 0:1: aJ1.lthe1i1e juds-nt A 2t"12£A

KQn_

aaw a Dew

p~obl.lil

len.. (aJl1thetlc
1&

arl:dxlS_

judPlOntA.J1

~~.

32.&3.

,,\1though 3udgm.o:nt. 1\"01'11

:aoiatU:&E&) could valldl1

$Xpel"-

a~

the oontent of the subjeot by amplo7ing aotual

expe~lene.

to

justity conneoting a new predioate to the subjeot, st111, with
this new t)'PG of synthetI0 judgment, in whioh there was a oomplete

d1V01'O$

trom exper1enoe, what oould be the unknown X which

justifIed the linking or the neW pl'adloate to the subjeot?
example, in judpenta involving

tiL

~

oausal relation l1ke ttWhatever

happens bas a cauae,· What prinoiple allowed one to conneot ue.
aauae" to "whaiUtver happen. ft . . .and that necessuil., and universal
111

The evidence of expar1enee was neIther suttlc1ent17 unlv.!'..

sal nor neoessary.
For Kant 'tihis problem _aa emphasized In synthetic
judsmen'ti.

~ E~1orl

Of oausallty, beoause tor him on17 one tera

causal relation oould be tound b7 his &na11s1s ot the
atatl0 subjeet-ooncept. l • Now whenoe dtd tbe.. causal relations
01' tb8

arise'

~tr

neOGssltl ruled out ohangeable experience aa a

source.

f.bet.rela'lvlt7 excluded _he absolute ooneept

source.

The onl,. remain1ns aolXt'ce was the lmowins mind, and

tharef·Ol'e

xaat

was fao.4 with the absolute need

dl tioDa or mentu!l.l

tWItS tOl1

a8

a

or .!. 2r1os-&

oon-

s!,\T1na the If.cieno •• whioh would 11.

impotent without oausal prlnoiplea.

KAnt kn•• that aince be had

de1HJrmined to saYe selene. tJlom the out.et, he had to j'WIt1t7 t
joining of tbe predioate to tbe subjeot in all thea. synthetic
• 'd

'I
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judgments A 21"10£1 •
.B1"leflYI 1n order 'bo be genu1ne, scienoe had to haft

synthetio .!. '11'101'1 judgmenta... aynthotlc judgments to in.va new..

nesS and sOientlt1c

progrea8J~ R~&or&

judgments to insure un-

ohangeableness and unlvax-sa11ty 1n sclence.

In reacting aga1ns'

Hume' •••naistt. seepiloi.ra. Kant was trying to deZend and to
pro.cte solenee bJ' means of syntbet" judgmeats .!

21'~orl.

was onl,. one weak-spot with these jw.1pents.

oould that

110\1

Theft

toreisn predioate be Jotned Tal1dl1 to ijQe subJeot? And tbus
Kabt crystallizes his entbe

q2\ltlg,v.e,

he :t'1oal17 touoheur the

core questlon of the Kant1an 57"tam wben he asks. "How al'e 8flltbetic judgm$hts .l El:'lo:t;.l posslblet u1S 'lh1s problem J%lS.rka the
pivota.l :point of I'.ant t • w01"k.

Now no one dou'bts the benetit. ot un!. t1 and

cl~lt'7

that a oent1"€.l.l probl.a can bestow on an author's work.
atte~

Bowe....r,

tteadlng and stud71ns the Ox-1t1iSe, 8Jlrone Who make. a

11ttle ren••tu.on upon Kant'. centll'al ques'i1on, tbe mult1tude ot

smaller pX'oblems involved. and the va.' c,\onaequ$W)es 1mp11ed,

=-7 w$11 find two questions ooourr1ng 1n his thought.
made an o.el'-.1mplif1cat1on 1n tOJ'Jmllatlng 'the problem'

Bas Kant
It not,

has he, then, olear17 shown the exaot baftttlng of aYe!'7 sub-

.-dina,.a p.roblcna to this. que.'ion about the po.s1b1l1tl til
15 1\9.nt, Cr1t1g,ue, 3S.
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synthetic judgments ~ R~1o~1'le

Man7 critics confess at least soma obscurity in finding the preois. internal relation of all the parts of
Crltliue

It

ta.

tgFe ReasQn to the oritioal problem stated in th8

1ntroduot1on. 17 But Norman Kemp Sm1th goes beyond this aDd
suggests that Kant 1s guilt., of over-simplifioation. sinoe Kant
does not carefull., detine what he means bJ' the qu.estion and thu.a

leaves room for man., additional problema. 18
Up t. this po1nt 'he ohapteX' has deali; with the oallle.

or Kant-. oritioal problem and how he finall., focused upon his
cen1;l'al problem, n. .17. "HOW are sJllthetlo .fudpenta

~

2X'lor1

In s~ry, then. 1t has been shown that Kant se'

possibl.'"

18 Note that other great minds have atuempted to reduoe tb$ whole of their work to a 81ngle problem and som&t~s
have. suo. oeeded. An example of this can be tound in the !~
'rll&olo5foa or St. Thomas Aquinas. He tells us (1n s. 'l!., • 2,
1)', Ipr noipalla lntt!ultio • • • e.t Del oognltlonemtrade"•• tI
Thus his central proble. 1s "VJho 1s God 1" and he takas pal1'ls to
poiQt out at least in general the :relation of .Ol'e than. a thousand articles towards the solution of this probl~. His habit
ot showing the oonneotion between various qaestiona and sub.
questions 1s done Ter'1 b.. letly, perhaps, even in an 1ntroducto17
pbraae. but 1t 1s done. ot. to%' example, !. 1., 1.11, 90,
proo.mum, where

st.

Thomas indicates the conneotion between his

treatise on Satan and his treatises on law and graoe, adding the
relations of subordinate artIcles.
17 ct. fol' example, Smith! c~entar~ xxI'paton,
Me:tiaaI1C,.!! ~er1ea•• , 4a-t>OJ~ l'. L dsaT, "Int1"oiiiw!on," 'Eo . erJmG.nstIS~arJ' edition of the C,rltig,u!I x-xi.

~t'.

lB

Smith,

Co~ntarl,

43.
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out to defend seience and morals.
flicts and dilemmas

He was oonfronted with con-

from a oontradiotory rationalism.

a~islng

Uumets s08pti01sm .. and the natUl'al S olenoes.

Atter marl',

'1eaI-S

ot patient pondering he overoame these obstacles by disoover1ng
S1Dthet10 judgments .! l?r10l:'1. which led bim., as if by a secret

pass, to valid science and solid morals.

But than

~ere

re-

mained the problem ot explaining how thBse judgments oould be
tONed.

Th1s last question,

the~erore,

Now this present stud.,

Kant's exaot

~aning

became his ohief concern

a:bte~t8

to discover

in his baslo question.

Y/hat waa

It has been pointed

out previously that even an fUlIsayed objeotive interpretation of
Kant's words by reoognized Kant1an scholars leads on17 2~obabll

to Kant's actual meaning.

Th$ interpretations which tollow

aoceni;ua:be this fact While exposing a multipleX answer to the

p:t*esen' quel'71

wut doe. Kant mean b7 his sta.rting question?

In oo_enting on Kant's starting question, N. K. Smith

saJs that the Dol,. words 1n it whioh do not admit of amb1gu1t7
and

08.\UUt

trouble al'e "s7Uthetio Juds-nt. A 2r.lor&" since the

"ROW" and the npos s ible" admit ot man1 dUf.rent senses.

An4

let, aa shall be seen later on, that very pb.raae, "S711theti0

Judgments

.~

2rlop1," de.plte all of Kant'. desoriptions and

subdivisions. 1s not altosethe:r olea~ and unquas1lionable. 19
n

ri

r

TberetOl'O, Tax-1aus :mo:an1 nsa oan be expOOh4 in eve'1!'S
~

Siw,l'ting q\&Gstlon.

priori, tt

e.na

words,

-Bow,·

"synthet.lo judemeJl1ul!.

"1'oIs11.110" -111 .a.11. btl o(}tu,lderea in ita t ..n.

1110 w()t'd

"llow"

:ma.,~~1l'£tt .intl'OOUO$ a

pl'$senta

tVIO

different: lll.,nUl1t1gs.

quoatlQQ asklng,

faculties and .quip_nt, ft do synbttc
a'Uout;_

pQ" .. ,..

o~ 4sal0, tba'

-Do,."

-1

tt

1n what:

war,

3ud~Qi\$

It

It

tflJl what;

AB&2tt.J.. come

be 7.4"0$4 to aOTslSthins

11_.

"Well, as .. ma t'~ 01' tao', hew al"e'hey POI a1b1.'· In ~b.1'
exolaltat01*1' atlas. the -Bow· ls equivalent to a ~"lbothor.·
in o.ooo~d w1\h the ODe . . tho otheJ' mea!U.oc;, either-

f41d

r.ant'a

IU2a17tloox- his s7J;'lthetl0 l.ltGthod He. to ElMWOl* ,be or1""oa1

pl'ob1. . mo.. tlfl.tufuc1;ol'llJ.20

b
t;:rpe e1'

p~tla.,

-,,;ynthe'" 3udgmen1Ja .......
a prlol'l,· denot.. a
.. ,
, ,'.

3udsaent whioh

'1on. tJrlt11 the

av~arl

e~l'i.al

suftlo1611tlJ cleQ

"tore

part ot tulla t1\. .1I, 1t may be

u,.am1na

taken

tot' &1-$.0'.4, ao B'a.ttt ~ol.f aeome 11. do, ~t the ua:t\a'C of

that whioh he dlvUos, lllUi!le17, juds-nts, 18 adeq,ua1Je17 k'nawn. 2l
As tor

.e. .wtiS&.

Ka.nt ••111 Me J.teaae1"'tl tbat 1t .,t:IJlS

independence tltom 6ltpOl-J.e.e. 22 Oon4tequelltlJ, he d1v14.a
1

4

II I I

.,.

20

t II PI

smth,

pJ!D!itUZ' 43.46.

21 &'111 ltr;.m'. s.snol*anoe of tl.ut nata•• of JudgmewiU bo shewn as a major oaule in theobeolD""ltJ of hi' division
of Jud. . .'. f 'rh11 18 • ___%tHed 1n ChapiJe. IV, page 90 of the
p"eaent 'hefd... To be summarized later.

I
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judgments

~

2rlerl intO' thoso whioh are independent of this

o~

that experience, snd those which are entirely independent ot
The latter type ef juCSgment he subdivides intO'

experience.

impux-e !. 2rlorl judgments t tha t is I those which, thouf;h made
without an7

d~ect 1"ete~&ne.

to' experience, have borrowed at

least one cO'ncepticn from that seut'Oe. snd into pur o !.

2rlo~1

judgments Inwhich nct O'n17 the nexus but alsO' the cO'noeptiO'ns

are entirel1 independent of experienoe.

subdivisions, he may wonder whether
pl.1r$ !.

2r~O'rl

S!.

When cne analrzes these
£ae1;O he has an,. suoh

judgments which are a.bsolutely nen-empirical,

wlthnc strings attaohed to' them trailing back to' former sensatiens.

Such Judgments Gould not, of oOUl-se, be bad without

Kant's CO'pernioan Reyolutiun being true. 23

Since H. J. Patonts tx-ea:tnaent of "sJrlthetlc" j\\dpenta
seems Y6%7' apt, attention 18 oalled

~o

his faithful exposition

of what Kant means 01 "s,nth8t10."
discussion 1. the diatinotl0
between analJtlc and synthetio judgment ••
Tba turning point of this

At first eight no distlnction would seeIU to. be s1mpler. Either the predi(,Hllte B belongs to the subjeot A as
sOWlth1ng which is contained (oovex·tlJ) 1n the conoept ot
A-this 1s an analytic judgment: or else the pt'ed1oate B
11es entirell outside the concept of A, although 1t is
oonneoted with It-th1a 1s a synthetie judgment.
• • •Synthetio
• • • • • judgments
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
may be either a EosteElor! or a
,2.,...101'1. tAll triangles have the thl'ee interIor anglo.a 1

23

,

Faton,

61
equal to two right angles' 1s a synthetio ! riori judsment. In both cases the p~edloate adds some SIng whioh
is not thDUSht in Ube oonoept of the subject, but the
seoond judgment 1s charaoteri.ed by necessity and universality, and is tnerefore, ! prior1 as well as s~1thetlc.24
Thus

fa~

one sees a olear description and division of tbe spe-

cies of synthetic judgments.

But, as Paton adm1ts,25 the difficulty is this,
is implioit and what 1s not implioit 10 a ooncept?

ttwhat

It might

seem to be implioit 1n the conoept of triangle that the interior
angles

al'e.

equal to two right angles J but this Kant would detlJ'

to be an analytio judgment."
As tor examples of analytic judgments, Kant presents

"anow 1s White" and Paton offers "gold is yellow," thus indicating that "white" is implioit in "snow," and "yellow" implicit ln

"sold."

On the other hand, they a£1'11'm. that synthetio judgments

are exemplified by proposi'liions such as "bodies are hsa'V7" and
"swans are white," where "heavy" and "White" are not implicit in
the respeotive sUbjeots.
How

wbJ "white" should be contained implicitly

1n the

conoept ot snow and not in that of swan 1s not too evIdent upon
examination.

Yes, there are swan a which are not white.

it impossible that tbex'e be a snow which is not white?
24

Ibld. 82-83.

25

Ibid. 85.

Still is
M01'BOVer,

tbe reason why "gold-is-yellow" should merit different 01ass1-

1'10&t10n than ftbod18$_Al'e-heavyu a88JDS somewhat subjeotive, i t
not entt.ell

80.

Even the pro-Kantlan Paton admit. Mtn. nature

of analytic judgments [and consequentl,. of' s:ynthetic juagmanti]

18 not altogetMt' 0188.%,.26 This ebsourli,. may arise fro. Kant ••
_noel' of dividing judgJll8niuI.

The final expression in Kant's crltl,al p.X'oblem to 1M
examined 1s the W'ol'd "poJuslble", and here N. K. Smith.. tollowlns
Valh1ngel', points out six dlfterent meanings of tf p08s1ble," all

of Which Kant emplo7' at various t1_a.

The au meanings, wlwn

11sted 1n contrasting pairs, are as tollows. How are synthetl0
judsments !. Erlorl iIsgholoSiculll:l posslble' How

i2$sib•• '

Bow are they po.sible of .!l2l!na~lon.?

ot an .xi.tene,? How are the,. posslble in the
the,. possible in the 1d...

,?

~osloa'lz

Row ptuuJible

~.a*?

Row al'e

Eaoh meaning w111 be 'aken up "%7

brlet1,._
BOw are sJnthetl0 jud~nt. ~ a~lo~l 2ls0ho.os1cal6l

peas lble ,

In

o~.r

WO.d8, what are tbe subj.etlve conditione

.for this type of ,udpent' 'l'hltough what mental taoultS,.a do
t;hey take pla.e?

stud,. of the Transoendental Aesthetio

a~

the

Tran.cendental Analytic reveals that !ant will include the tor..
Of aenaation (space and tl. . ) and the pure torms ot thought (the

2S

fb14.

86.

catego~les)

in bis response to this question.

How are these
can they be valtd!

ing

~e

~1.

jud~nt.

106108.111 possIble'

or

how

question is 10 It.ett twofold, embra.-

po•• ibl1itr of some nexus between subjeot and predioate.

and the pO'$1b:1l1ty of an objeotlvely val:1d p%'edloatlon

or

the.e

judgments.
Row £Ute these judgment. poss1ble of eaFJj>lagatlon?

1s Kant going to aooount tor them.?

hena1ble.

How

They have te be made ooltpre-

Tbis question flJAy well have goaded Kant on to popu-

larize his dootrine in the Probesomega.
BOw are synthetio judgments
"noe?

~ Erlp~1

possible

In other w9rda, how can 1me:r ex18' at all?

of,"~llt

Aocording to

the rationalists and empiriolst. 1t wQuld aeem one oannot even

think suoh ju.dpenta.
La.'ly, sinoe Kant employs all 81% meanings of "posslble," it seems advisable to present a summary paraphrase ot
N. K. Smith t • final distinction between
possible in the 1"eal llnd in the

~p.aiL.27

Jud~nta

which are

According to Kant,

nain.tfal soienee and mathematics already enat compo.ed

thet10 judsa:aents .! Ill-,io!:i.

or

sJU-

When applied to these judgaents,

Kant 1 s 1n1t1a1 question asks how these rea. judgments used 01
scientists oan ex1st.
27

Srd th, CQmmentarz;. 52, whioh is pa.raphrased hero.

64

But 1n Kant-s opInIon metaphysIcs has not yet been
ifhus 1t remains a goal to be 8t1'1"n tot-

cohel'entl;y realized.

along w1th the synthetio judgments A prlo~1 whioh are expected
to torm its taot-10.

Knotts basic question, when direoted at

these judgments ot the futUl'e, lI1ght be replu.'tased nlOl'e exp11cit.
ly into,

~BDw

are these

~deal

synthetio judgments

the new metaphysic possible?"

~

Erior1 ot

Kant offerea the basis ot th1s

last d1ffereDO. in meaning wben be formulated hi. startlns question in one way for pbJslos ano

n~thbmatl0.

and in

anot~r

wal

for m&taph1.s10s. 2S
In

St~

then, one finds not a. 11ttle ditfioult,.. and

oomplex1tl in seekIng the moaning of a seemingly simple question
Its tmmedtata clarlt1 1s attraotiveJ and Jet, on further invest1
gat10n, so man7

v~ioua

meanings are found 1n every expression

tha1i one begins to wonder whether Kant oould not have stated hi.
st~lns

question aore

aha~ply

aDd unmistakably, or perhaps,

.

oyen wheth&r he baa posed a real problem.
"

To obviate this doubt about the rea11t:v or h1s cr1t1ca
problem, Kant directs the evidence of his Introduction towa~ds
establiShing the real existence of an

~

2rior1 synthesis.

this commenoes the third pu1i or the pl*Nent chapter:
of Kantts proble••

And

the proof
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Now although the existence ot S Olue aensible things oan

be apprehended immediately through sensibly experiencing those
things. it frequently- happens that s.tf11'mat1ons of :real exist.

enoe rest on a transit of' the mind

trOI;'

an e:dsting effeot to

its real cawse, as in the wall-known e.x.amp1e ot Robinson

Crusoe's 01scover7 of the existence of another man on his island.
Ku.nt thinks tbe existenoe of synthetio judpents !.21'Io%',i 18

1Dmted1ate17 eTident.
em1')10'18 1n

Nevertheless,

tOl'

h1areadvB' sake be

the Introduotion 1iil:l.1s •• cond method of inferring

their existanceb7 moving

~o.

existing propositions to speoifio

aots ot understanding.
Therefore I in the tah1rd part of this ohapter an effort
w111 be made to ana11se this Q1'IguJl'J8nt of Kant in to\ll* W8.7.' (1)

07 finding what bis tive premises are, (2) b1 bringing to

l~t

the logioal oonsequenoe which binds hS.s tlTe pl'emiaes toget;ber_

(3) b7 uncovex-lng the foundations of these five premiae., and
(~)

b1 pointing out one conoom1tant of these premises, namal1.

the preclUSion ot an abstraotive 101;811.ot.
An

examination of' tbe Prefsoe and Introduotion to

Kant's second edition reveals his use ot five senel*a1 premiaes.
I~st,

the bJpothesls ot the Copernioan ReTo1ution is justified.

Seoond17, universality and necessit,. are the .1gns ot !. 2"101'1
judgments.

Th1rd17.!. priori judgments exist in the soiences.

Eburthly. the oriterion of synthetio judgments is the predicate'

r

non-inclusion in the subjeot.s content.

And fifthly. the sol-

onces actually involve synthetio judgments

~ Erior~.

Since the logioal oonnection ot these premises does not
beoo~e

evident trom this list, their natural dependeDCG upon tb$

preoeding premises may be brought out expltcltly by reasonIng
a.long with Kant 1n the 10110\110g manner.
I oannot ask "Bow ue synthetio judgments .! priori

possible?" unless I know that they are possible.

But the way to

prove them possible is to px-ove thea existenoe.

brefotte DfJ

-

first supposition is the existenca of synthetic judgments a
~r1or1.29
I have

But as their existence will be or no use to me unless

some way ot' t>3111ng that they do Elx1st,I must lecondl,.

establish a nottDl tor l'ocognizing s;ynthet10 judgments !.

2rl~01'1.SO

But this nON, too would be mean1ngl.ss unless s oms !. pr1,orJ:

know1edae were possible.

aupposition_ the

S!.

'rherefore.. I must show, as rq third

1'aot! existenoe 01' some !. 2%*10%*1 knoWledge. 31

To do so, I must set down in advanne a norm tor distinguishing it
with oertalntr trom !. ioeterlorA knowledge. This will be . ,
fourth premise. 32 But even this norm wIll be meaningless unless
.1

29

Kant., ~r'tisue, 32.

30

-Ibid.

30 ...31.

31 I'bld. 26-28.
32

Ibid. 25-26.
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there 1s the possibility of some
The:r:>ef'ore I must es:tiabllsh the

possibIlity of

~

~

priori knowledge in general.

.!!.e.!.

~ua

non condition of' the

2r1orl knowledge, namely. tn. oonformity ot

things to the mind.

This will be m;r t'1fth and la.st suppos!....

t.1on. 33
But ho'w does Kant establish and %'s-antoroe these suppo.
sitions?

On what X'easons do his .five premises restf Wl'q', tor

example, does he o1a1m that the h1Pothesls of his ·Oopernioan
Revolution" 1s justified?

ing the

funda.~ntal

He answers that the need of discover-

diffioulty whioh reta.rds the growth at

metaphysios, a.nd the ex.a.mples of the other well-developed so1.enoe8, are reall1 suffio1ent oa.uses tor inverting the direotion
of man 1 s knowing, a' least as an experiment.
Universality and strict necessity are the norma tor
reoognizing !. i!rlorl knowledge becausG, ea78 Kant, onl,. subjective generaliaation can mar-k that knoWledge whioh we fOh

trom exper1ence.
An70ne familiar with the demands ot soience knows that
1ts propositions

~t

be universal and

necessa~J

and Since

val-ious scienoes exist; !. 2rlor1 judgments a.lso exist.
Kant's foundation for his thi:rd premae.

Such 1s

68
l~nt views his fourth premise as a truly origina134

basis for dividing

~

priori judgments.

implicit in the subject or it is net.

Either the predioate is
Thus the important impli-

oation of this pl'emise, Y/hich Ka.nt .1'e17 pOSits without thorough
explanation. 1s the existenoe of some norm that determines the
extent of contenta. in the subjeot ..concept.

bl'e exists aome

principle which determines that "white" will be contained in the
ooncept of "snow" but excludes "heavy" from the concept of
"body."

Kant rests his final premise, that the sciences aotual-

17 inolude s,ntbetio judgments
the synthetio and

~

~

21'101'1, upon an exposition of

21'101'1 oharacter ot judgments such as=

"seven plus five equals twelve," "in all ohanges of the material
world, the quantity of matter remains unchanged," and "the world
must have a beginning."
Such are the foundations upon which Kant rests
premises of his proof.

t~

It seems strange that eaoh one of these

explioit premises effeotively preoludes the theory of abstraction
as a possible explanation of the origin of universal, necessary
judgments.

And yet, right from the beginning of his oritioal

,.

"

thinking, when Kant bad first
Herz,

abst~aot1on

eA~lained

was ruled out.

his dlffloult7 to Marcus

69

Henoe, the pure conoept of' the understnnding cannot be
abstracted from the data of the senses, nor do they expl.'tess our oapaoity for receiving representations through
the senses. But,whilst they Dave their souroes in the
nature 01' the soul, they originate there neither as the
result of the action of the QbJect upon it, nor as the~
selves producing the object.~5
Through thi$ omiaa10n or positive exclusion of another "hypothes1s," Kant may be forming a parvus, tnorJ..a initio against
whioh st. Thomas gives warning.

However, such a suspioion per-

tains mora to the critical part of this thesis.

35 Kant, Letter to Marcus Herz, February 21, 1772,
translation taken from Smith, C9!e!nt&rZ, 220.

CHAPTER IV
EVALUATION OF

At this point it ls
understanding of tne

nat~a

premiaes rather oarefull,._

Y~NT'S

necessa~7

PROOF

for a mora thorough

of Kant.s arguments to examine hi.
For thls de'ba,iled ana17sls two of h1

fiYe premiae. have been seleoted.

F1rst, Kant's division ot

judgments will be examined to tlnd t1» cause. ot the obscurlt,already noted.

Seoondl,., Kant •• "Copernioan Revolution" will be

studied to see whether 1t meets tbJ requirements of a justifiable

!In>othesie.
The obscurlty and contusion resulting

f~om

Kant's divi-

slon of judgmants were established as faots when treat1ng in the
previous ohapter about Kant's exact meaning in tne phrase "syntheta judgments !. ll£'o~,. ttl

At present the oauses of thi.

obsourity a.nd oontusion are sought.

.

HOYI

can they be found?

method selected 1n this study is empir1cal.

The

It prooeeds on the

prinoiple that one very probable aause of this obsaurlt,. was
Kant •• failure to

1

~asp

olearly the elements oonst1tut1ng that

Cf. pages 69.62 of the present thesis.
70

71

which he 1ntended to divide.

ConsequentlY, a study of Kant t •

judgments conside1-ed 1n thea constitutive elements of ton and
matter (the copula and the conceptions

or

subject and pttedicate

respective1,.) will elucidate the causes of the disagreements and
difficulties in Kant's division.
term

Jud,_n~

Fer the sake of cluit" the

will be used to indicate the intellectual operatio

ttselt, and 2ro2ositioA to stgnir, the known term of that operation.
In examining propositions

rust according to

their

formal element, namel,., the1r copula, it ts seen that Kant explio

1t17 atf1rms tba t the predicate alw9.7S
at tillmattve

judgments.

latlon ot inherence.

be,12Di~

to the subject 1n

Scholastics can recognize hAtre the1%' reIn an8.17t10 judgments Kant speclfies this

belonging or inherenoe as a relation of ident1ty joining the
predicate and subject. 2

FOr synthetic judgments this belonsing

is not bad through a relat10n of identity, in Kant's sen.e, but
through a concrei;e union of'S. and F. grasped in

e~r1en.e,f

01-

thx"ough a ome other unknown X as unif71ng bond.

Before continuing with tn. examination, a distinction
1s in order conoerning this relat10n ot inherence.
may be twofold.

This relation

There 18 the actual relation whioh exists and

also the relation which the knower affirms as existing.

1~8.
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two w1ll be identical in true un1versal propositIons, but d1f.
ferent when the propositions are false.
Fol'l

example, in the propos1tion, "Gold 1s non-rusting,"

the:re 1s a X'alatlon exist1ng between the mean1ng ot "gold" and
that of "something whioh does not rust.-

T.he aotual relation ma,

be one ot ldent1t:r, though tbe knower may attlttta 1t as a non-

identioa1 relation.

It is obvlous, therefore, that a division at

judgments based on the relation "hieh the knower att1rms as existing between S. and P. rather than upon the actually extstins
relation will cause oontusion and obsourlty when many men oome t,
employ the division.
Moreover, a further souroe ot obsourity oan be seen it
the diviSion e:r

judemen~s

is based not on tba formal relation ot

identity or non-identity, but upon the intellectual operation

through which these %»01at10n8 are apprehended, i.e., the operatioDS of analysis and synthesis.

Using the example given above, one man may gl'asp the

identity between "gold tl a.nd "non-rusting n b7 analyzing his oon..
oapt 01' "sold," even If someone else must make the af't1rltlation

only through synthesis.

These observations reveal
dividing judgments.

t~ee

possible bases to.

These bases oonsl., in differenoes :t'ound

(1) in the objeotive relation between S. and P., (2) in the
relation whioh is affirmed as existing be,ween S. and P. by some

ImoWGJ', and

13) Sa 11M opera'100 ot Judasa..

It allouW .. notio.a _bat in dlvldlna

~u4_._

..

t ...., 'buu _n'1o".4 ahc\lJ.rl al-ra 1M tbe AlDdaBD1lalnOh i t
..

ob~.otiY1t1

ota 1018a'I£10 d1vla1on 18 .ougllt. Bowe....,

tho o1dw. bu.sahouJ,d hot; '0. ov-lookad 1n la'or auWlv1alon.l.

It alao toUo. . ., .,. . . . a, divi8ion or

~g4. .r.t1uJ

the a.oODd Q4 tbiN •••• g1.$a abore, iho . . . "

".et. oft

,"00._ .J.n-

~.c'e4 .1~.~~..'1v1a••

... ltNa' • •en dlyiding ~"_"" ."71, "Au.l»1d,oal

.am..-

lUCIa-a" (.tf~_tt") . . . . . . ., ... 1ho.. 1&'3 whl0h t4le
iion or -.. ,..d10a'. "ltab tbe ftb~••' AI!. &~ 1Jm-oUlb 14etlt,._8 . . ,8.tiloa "b:1oh irrsmedla'.1J 6»11••

l' '.oup U.ut!'" !lui' _,.

BUt

0••• ,

po~.

Ibi* 'b••i. ot <11vbloD is lob' GUf,llo:rlns he•• t
380"" "la'ioa ot S.

qd

P.......

.t

u, who
Is

Goaltat••

-7 Dot.

'1; .. Ob-

"lata. wlUch 11 4'..,1J'

attlNed '" . . . lDdlvl<half

. . . . ,ue'a'lOb

oODvlnolbsl:r kal's •• or 1. 8b009 .818. Btit; a

usal fit _
dou'b'li.

'- ,btl,
r

pQt

De8ide. ttl.

_.- .a ,.

• IS

t~

of hU

fJ. . . . .

~\tc'1ea

pe.

caanot JAaw . . .

"teNDO.' ,. bf.IIIelt

Wb10h 1M'

*' pe.'OD J\ld81ns, ezpu.ctt iSs' uo toUll.4 1n41oai;.

Id.a a:ttentlon 18 too_ed on the
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--110.
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relation \vhioh his mind attll,'ll'llB as existing between conceptions.
V~reover,

KAnt denominates propositions according to

the operation used in their

his terminology_

ro~matlon.

And his cla1m

This 1s brought out bJ

ot o1'181no.11t,-5 in div1ding judg

ments may have some fundament in so fax- as analysis and aynthcs1
are now made a norm of division.

Tb1s

third

b~s18

is as

eA~11o-

1t17 used as that ot oogitated ident1ty.6
Thus, the present examinat10n revea:a.s some subject1vis

in the language used by Kant to describe the copula in judgment.
Does this subjeotivism also exist 1n the examples he ofteps?

A

4 Examples of this taken trom Kant, cr1t~~. 30-32,
are the tollowinS: "In all Judgments whereln tlifj 1'6 Pion Of iii.
subjeot; to the predioate 1s ,00811;0.1;&<3 • • • .. (not s1mplJ'. 1s)J
"this relation is possible 31'l ~WQ ~r.rtorent ways." (Does"""'rB.nt
aean PO.SSib1eOf
1n two dlttel,'lent ways, or possible .tt
belPI tho " t tii
0 1tfe1"e·nt wars?), "I need not go beyoii<T the
00 cs
0 0 bod,. • • • ", "the manltol&-prop81"tles Which I thin
n
conception • • •
"loan C0fe!ZO beforehand by Qnil7S
the oonception of body • • •"ft"J~ow
n am I a~te to assert
• .. ." J Ita t01'elsn p1"edlcate B which the i'fders andlns neverthe.
less oonsider5 t.§ ~ c,onneotEtd with it. "ttiaersool'Ing and
parenlhesea a de .~

i;&nl

ft,

5

Paton, Kapt ','

r:>~ta1?li's10

.2! F;:XRe1"lenoe I

85.

6 Cf. Kant. arltisue, 30-31. ~ example, "I need
• • • ~relr ana17ze the oonoeption, that is become conscious of
the manifold propertios which I think in that oonoeption in orde1"
to d1soover this .,iredloate in 1t: 1t 1s the:refore an ana17tica1
judgment • •• ugoweve16 By the addition of suoh a predicate,
therefore 1t beoomes a synthetical judgment." ~e reason wbJ it
18 synthetioal or not is the mind's adding or not.add1ng to the
subject. This is dividing judgments aocording to the mental
operation p~oduc1ng them.
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faw 01' tbase may be oonsidered.
For example, when I say, 'All bodies are extended,' thia
is an analyt1cal judgment. FOr I need not go beyond the
conoeption of' •
1n order to f1nd extension oonneoted
with it • ••
s ls not an e~irloal 4udgment, but a
proposition which stands f1rm!. i~1Pl1.
Kant hex-a tells us he disoovers extension in the oonoept of bod7.
and

att~

1t with striot neoessity_
~e

necessity of
d1f'telrentlr

1"t'O)l1

oonnection.
Kant?

Yea.

Be

Be does not prove tb8

affirms 1t. Do othera aee lt

N. K. Sa1th lays 'tibia proposition

oannot;
be ~eoosn11.d as true save in terms of a oo~reban.1V8
1;heo1'1 of' plqaioal erdstenoEh If _ttar must exist in a
state ot d1stribution 1n order that 11;8 parts may acquire
through mu:tual attraotion the property of welght, [then]
the size ot a bod,., or even lts posses.ing any extension
wbatsQevel'*, -1 sim1larly Ciepend upon speoifl0 oondlt1ons
suoh as _7 oonoelvab17 not be unlvel1sal17 reallsea. S
Here Smi1ih questions the

Kant'. neXWJ.

enoed tao'.

DocesauT un! versal1ty aff1rmEu2 ln

Kant has undoubtedly 8.11ed a univeraal17 expe1"lBut perhaps he has contuaed his affirmed

of atr10' universal neoessity between
tbe objeotive17 existing relation.

e~ena1on

relation

and body wl'h

Besides, 1f this

att~4

relatlon 1s deX'lved trom ezperlence, then how oan 1t also be

universal and neoessary aocording to K'an1i'
Secondly, Kant saya the relation in the proposition
I

1

:(I

I

'1

Ib¥_

8

3m'bh,

Pomr-ataU'

39.
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that sevan-plus-f1ve-e equals-twelve 1s not one ot 1dentity.

Th1s

_ana that the predioa.L te 1s not oontained 1n the su?Jeot-conoept.
yet even the pro-Kant1_an Paton admits, "It may, h01'/9Ver, be malntained that all mathe~t1oal 3udgments are analytl0. u9

Here

again the olassitioatl_cn of 3udgments seems to depand on the per ...
• on olassi.r,.lng.
&a117, Kanat sa.,.

'~'ver7thing

tha t happens has a

cause t 1s an example 0.-1' a 81tlthetl0 judgment.

The disagt-e .... nt

of xnost soholastio phi-.... J.osophers with Kant on this judgment because ot tho1l'

e.xposit_~ 10ns

.videnoe 1n the

1nvest_~1gat1on

Do any of

sub3eotivism. 10
~om

Ka:~nt's

Sm1t!~la

of subjectivism?

doctrine

ot 1ts analytic nature adds more

of subjeot1v1sm in Kant's diviSion.

or1tios oorroborate these indioations

frequently charges Kant with general

1'&tOO_L. who explioitly aims at saving Kant's

the

oo~.~cding

influenoe of Smith's

theo~,

answers

the oharge of subjeotl<r:vlsnt in Kant.s dlvlsion of Judgment b:r sar-

ins. "mant-.langua.ge : :Son places might suggest that the dlstino ...
tlon is subjective} bu,:,_1; thU, I thlnk, 1s t2l'ue only when the
subjeot-conoept 1. emp!~rioal • • • Kant does not mean h1a di.tine

'10n to be _rel,. a. sU1fbJectiva one. ull Indeed .. Kant intended hi.

-

9 Paton ..

~tts

Metappzslc

10

or.

11

paton, Kar&:ltf~ Metaphn1c

1£ E3Re~1ence. 89.

Smith' -. lndex on "Subjectivlsm," Commen,ta1"l. 650

!!.

a~r!~,enc., 83-84.

7'1

distinction to be scientifio and objective.
is

~.quent17

But one's intention

misoarried 1n the execution.

However, Paton's defense, over and above its admission
01'

some subjeotivis1U in Kantfs division, 1s beset with two dif-

fioulties.
F1rst, Paton's answer seems to be begging the question,
sinoe one ot the things Kant must establish 1n his proof 1s the
existence of propositions whose subjeot-oonoepta are absolutely
independent of experienoe, and not j'WIt wishtul17 thought to be
so 1ndependetl".
Seoondly, 1f Kant allows some subjeotivitY' in his div1Sian, where i. hB golng to draw the linet

If he admits. as he

does,l2 that the judgment "gold is non.rusting" may be analytioal for those skilled 1n metallurgioal research and at the same
time synthetioal for those not skilled in handling metal', he
oannot 10g10al11 retuse to classif)" judgments like "the human

80ul is 1m=:lDrtaltt as both analytIcal and synthetical under simi-

'I

Yet, Kant maIntains this Judgment
synthetical without exoeption. 1S It tbo norm he allows tor ~elt

lar ciroumstanoes.

were also applied here, thi8 judgment concerning the human soul's
immortalitY' would be analytioal for those who see clearl, the
12 Kant I
13

~ritig.,¥"

Ibld. 241.

4l7.
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essential

p~opert1es

of the soul, and synthetIcal for the majori

ty whD are non-skilled in psyohological analysis.
Therefore. both the language and the examples used OJ'
Kant

as well as the testimony of a pro-Kantlan ol--1t10 point to

one conclusion.

Kant tailed to realize that a mette subjective

lncapao1ty to see that a proposItion 1s actually analytical doea
not make that judpent synthetio.

The elements joinea in judS-

ment do have a relation, and this objeotive nexua-not the sub....
jeotive apprehension of 1t, nor the operatIon through which It is
apprehendea--must be the fUndamental basis in dividing judgments.

From suoh an examination of Kant-s copula in judgment
it

~t

be more than evident that the variety Of wars in whioh

the copula was viewed was oaused b,. the veJ:'iety of oontent in the

subject.oonoept existing among various people.
fingel' to the heart of the pttoblel'l1 aptil;v enough.

Paton put his
-The dUfi-

oulty,· he says, "1s to know what 1s implloit, and what 1s not
1wp1101t 1n a aonoapt."14
These words -1 serye as an introduot1on to an examina-

tlon ot the matter in KAnt.s judgments, namely, his conception.
of predicate and sub3eot.

Vlbat 18 a conception tor Kant? The

answer to this question can be broken down into an analysis ot
Kant's own words, a unified desor1pt1on of Kant's oonoept1on,
r

F

F F
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and a consequence which lssues from bis view of what a

oonoeptlo~

is.
Before viewing Kant's Ideas, the reader might erect a
background of quest10ns asainst whioh to
ments.

cont~ast

E,7£mples of such questions Jnight be these.

Knnt's state·'Is Kant·

here desoribing the intelligible quiddtty of the thing?"

"Is he

confusing the unlver.'sal concept und the sc:n.matie phantasm?"
"Is be emphasizing intelleotual content in a oonoeption?"

F1rst, then, to present a patoh.llke description of
ooncept1ons wInch Kant otters in01dental11 durlng his Introduction to the Crtt1g,ue.

He says that explicattve 3udgment.a

onlY' a.nalyze 1t the liubJeot] 1nto ita oonstltuan1i oonoeptions, whioh were thought already in the subJeot,
although 1n a oonfused manner. 15
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
I can aognize befottehand by analy-sis the conception ot'
bod,. through the oharacteristios 0.1' extension, 1apenetrabl11ty. ,hape, etc., all whlch are oogitated 1n this

oonoeption.1.6
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
if we take away by degrees from our oonoeptions of a
body all that can be reterl'ed to mere sensuous expex-lenoe-..

t,..-

oolour f hardness or softness, \velght, even iapenetrabl11
the bOd,. will then vanish; but the spaoe Which it oooup1ed
stl11 remains, and this 1t is utterly tmposslble to annihilate 1n thought. 1V
Soma of the anSWel'S to the questions used as a x-sierenee baokLId

, 'I

15

Kant, Qrit&sue, 30.

16

tbid. 31.

17 Ibld. 27.

ground may already be taking shape in the reader's mind.

1!o make

1them clearer, 1"ete1"Gnoe will now be made to Kant's LoS1k, lince
it 1s generally agreed that Kant maintained the ideas of' traditional logio d\U'"ing his Cl"itlgue. 16
Kant saJs a oonoept 1s a~eR1"eaent,a,tl0 Eer notal
mal~ O£Mmunes. 19 "The aggregation of co-ordinate attributes
~erkma,~ constitutes the totality of the conoept. n20

'rheretol'a a oonoept tor FAnt 1.s a group of _rlonale.
F

~~t

1s a

mer~le?

It 1.s translated as representutiotl# attri-

bute, note, aba mark. though this leaves the question
1s 1ntel11gible or aensible or both, undetermined.

wh$t~r

1.t

These .rls-

male, "hioh were "ab'eady thought into a sub3ect," were considered aooording to the 10g1c of Kant's time to be d1vlded into two
gttoupsl

(l)!.S. essentlam t2srt1aanti4 which inoluded certain

ptt!m1tive and constitutive marks

(ssa~,nt1~11a).

as well as

attributes. whioh had their sUffioient ground in the essenoe and
ext~a eaaent1a*l~,

were derivative from it, and (2) tbe

which in-

cluded all other marks, whethe:r modes or relations. since both
wera not der1vative from the s •• enoe.

Thus, it the essence were

18 Ct. Smith, CQmmdntarz. 34, and Paton, Kan". Meta-

2Slsio !! !!2er1enoe, 187.t§6.
ed.

G.,

19 Immanuel Kant, Kant's
HartensteIn, LeIpzig, iaaa
l

,

20

Io&d. 93.

~!fk"
.,

in

as.

Iran","

lJerk!.

a1
pt'Gsen'. the attributes bad to be present, but this Wat no1; true
for the modes and :relat1ona. 21

b

taoti t:b.t1t rolations weI'S no'

)lecesstU'fl17 pl'•••nt ,'111 b$ or so_ importance later on. 22
Kant d1vides conoepts 1nto omp1r1oa.l and 1ntolleotual.

concepts.

:.t'he empirioal ooncepts tU.-G not definitions.

empl1fle. th1s in thG

'p'r~tl9.\\.

Kant

with the ooncept at' water.

Q.Jt-

ni'ha

"ord [Water]. with th€l tew marlUJ attached to tt, 18 more propes:e. de81gna tioD than a oonception of the thlna. tt25 rus 1a the
Sobolastl0 ftdeaorlptlYG t'h)tlnlt1on."
Tbe

tntelleotual conoepts are also indetinable.

Qp.

<!lnarl11 fJheao at-a 1iho oategories, suoh u substanoe or oause,
but .em_times non..mpl.rlclll oO).1ceptl 11ko t'tlt;nesa" . . tt2J'lshti.ft

KAnt t a emplr10al and intelleotual ooooep'8 41"0 not
defin1tion.,

~+i)

not oomplete quiddi t1es, sinoe, .eco:ralns

Kant. the dGf'ln1t1on

e~eaSG.

thins, the enti1'e qu1dd1t,..

'0

thc.'f oomplete representatlon of thl

But he p1"GtOl'. to oall h1loonoepta

s~t,&OIl O~ !amB~&~1.0lla of the thlns. 24

Do theSG
of the thIns?

e!R2~&t~o!S

GXp1'eIS even a

pa~t1&l

qu1ddlv.,

Kant s1f'Jply does not emphasize the undcu.'.'andlng"

ea or. pas••

87-88

of the pt'cu'Ient tiheala.

23

Kant, C,Jt1t&:a• • 417.

24

lb&d.

apprehension of what a thing ls.

B1s empirical conoept may imp

some quiddity, but 1t 18 not a quiddity of the thing known, es_
pecially wben Kant oalls it

ua

rule by which my imagination oan

delineate an image."25 The empirical ooncept 1s oompounded with

an

~

21"101"1 element, but if this enriches the concept with any

mea.ning, it 1£1 meaning sprung from the understanding, not from
things.

Regarding his intellectual oonoepts, Kant's terminoloS1 1& too oonfused to allow an unqualified statement.

His

6a8111 di.cernible twofold use of eateg0tl--sometlmes as a unifying form, and at other times as the matter or oontent of

thought 26_-necess1tates a distinction.

In so far as Kant uses

the intellectual conoept as a synthesizing form it does not express a.ny quiddity.

In

BO

far as be usee it to indioate oontent.

than there mal be a quiddity

p~esent,

but 1t cannot be oalled a

quiddity of the 'ihtnS known, Since "the pure oono.ept is suoh tbaiJ
it 1s not d1-8.1In tram experienoe, but springs from reason in re-

gard to 1ts oontent."2'

In summary, therefore, Kant.s oonoepts are not quid.
di ties

or

the thing.

25
~

What are they then?

The pure conoept haa

Ibid. 119.

26 This discrepanoy was observed by Uberweg, History
Ph1*osoRSl. II, 164.
27

Kant, LoSlk, 89

S3

just been defined.

11le empu-lcal concept 18

sensible und lntell1g1ble obaracteS'1stloa,

uoent .tallinG Mav11J on the

t~ 01'

G.

compound of both

tWlalt>.

wl~

tbe

tho two element.. 'l'h18

a.naistic emphal18 1n the 01UP1x'1enJ. ooncept; 18 bx-oUih' Quia 01.....

11

by atud'11ng 'the _nner in whioh &lnt t}.bltl~W an empuloa)

oonGeP',He d•••~1be. the concelvins ot ". .e."
I ••• a apru,o., a lime, and u willw. I • • them,
0.ba$l'Ye that they dltr,£
tme ano .... It . regardl
U.:i:le sue,
and so one, ot tb.e11' 1irunk. theD
uMolwa, thea· ea.,.••. I
on what thi:r _n in
cODlOn, tua._17, t;wnk, 'Ox-ana SI and leawa. ADd X
• •i; .fi"om $ftX7'tb.1ng 1n which the aeen obj&ot. dUte.
~d

,Ganot_,..,

~B'I~

ft~• • •

A

t'l!U,
HPi·i.

.hape!

In thia 'war I obtudn

a concept

of

"'0 .t;,..1k1ns eample of emphasizing the GcMmati. phantaall

!.Dstead of goUg on to the In'ell1g1ble IWnnlng is found
~n"a

ttl

oonception of "dog,"

The concept of "dOl" a1Sn11~1.1 lbedeute"il a :rule aooord1. na
15o '.tllch . , 1mt.atnatloa oan delineAte ,on.tx-allJ' t4:le eb&pe
of a oerlln1n toutt-toO'" Qnimal withou.t '001111 lJld,te4
61-.. to so_ speOlal. ind1v1dual shape oft..." _ .~

. '18no. a. to 1R7 po.sible lndlvldual tma&e which I
Ja. '198°111',2.29
lI'ow "bil.

,1,;

oon.~'

1s tl'Wl that ... universal oonoep'ofaog does haw

a nOOes8lU'1 rate1"el1Ce to

so_ sob_• .-td,e phanwaam

tel'

1', spoos.-

.t1oat1oD, 81no& 1ihe 8p$ol!'lc dt1'fel'onoe or dOS .soapes ,he hl.a18D
I

I

'1.n

r nr

28
29

wlt;b. Groat.,.

"bl"1.-

92.

(unde1'800l:'lng tl:dde4.)

Kant .0K1!JalI!., 119. Tb18 dootl'1ne 1. elaboltated
d.'a1i
til !£&e'"""'.tiauaootldentnl Deduo't1on aDd tbe

So_mat Ism ot tho Oategorle••

01

1n'61100t.

n~vev'bolesa, Kan~

neither stressel nor even
lien,-80ft.,

the in'bolllalble nat_e of doS.

a rule aocopd1ns to wb1eh

mu

n

18

oonceptwhloh "_ana

imagination cun delineate the shapo·

U not a conoep' of what ados 18.
phantasm.

Q

men~1oal

It _,. be a guide to the

00' an nl')~h&nsion

nu'

ot tho aatee or doe_

It"....

1t »IAat be ".e• •o1'oo tl:lat even 1n COl1oeptus 11ke "dOSD Qnd

there

SN,

aooord1ng to l{an'b, the

p\C"O

!.

i~~'I£'

el.-uta

IUGh

u

81.lbstanoe and space.
~

oonfUsion \'Jhl.ch l:'08\111;8 fraul wU.rlS sueh Gono.pt.

as '*bodJ'ft in sU'pl)oseCSl1 sOientific pztopoalt1t1IUI beeamea a.tdeQt.

one

ppecU.oato 1s oonsWered 1q)1101t in

al.wql 'been associate. with that group

Q

subje.t because

or .r~

t,

btl.

in .enae ox-

perl.Doe. i'hus tb1a ••natam in Kant's conoeji.rt10,ne obs$u.'I.'el aad
Qontua.s h1s division of

Jud~Dta.

Ano1#hel' Nault ot this ovel:'..~a1z1nG ot tbe len..

ol:larao1el'1at'101 in conoeptions 1s that the attention

o!~

one

(U)n-

sid.ring thas e ooneeptlops 18 attraoiod to tho lot111t10na1 vlsw
of the sonse data, th.1r

plo'~eeotrbGn'.

subtle 1rrliellig1ble mean1xlG 1nvolvo4.
be ,~ ttpl.o'~ logic," whe~

ftthor tlmrt

Tb1a lead.

'0 ,_

'o~t

Id.sht

aUG oonoep' 1, conoel,," u

belns 1.;",1101' in the aubJeo'b-oonoept it the

tOl'ltDl'

1s l_al17

ooino.fAent w1'h tb.e phanttasm or the subjeoa-oonoept. Dee' Kant
tall 1nt;o this dUtloultyt
de01s10n -hlle

r.Qd1n~

The

!tGQi'ht!' _,.

incllne to a 'entat1.,..

the tollowing •••ds .t

Ian'.

the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as son~
what which is contained (though oove1't17) in the conceptlon AI or the predioate B 11es completely out of the
oonoeption A, although 1t stands in oonneotion with it.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
It I go out of and beyond the conoeption A, in order to
recognise ano~er B as Q8nneoted with It, What foundat1on
have I to rest on • • .3
Eithe~

Kant seems to be arranging picture-oonoepts.

At least he is

conoentrat1ng on their sense character instead of

the~

intel-

ligible meaning.
What Kant's conception 1s, and hoVi it 1£1 formed have
been explained.

There 1"e_1na f however, anothoxe sauro. of

subJeotivism in Kan1ifs diviSion ot judgJl1ents.

This 1s the nora

acoording to whioh Kant considers certain marks as implied 1n a
ooncept ant! ethel'S as extrinsio to it.

R1s norm al'bitrarlly

includes some sensible ollaroacter1st1os and absolute attrIbutes,
although it exoludes other equally frequent sensible

characte~

istioo and all relations.
Kant's ooncept or "body in general" exemplIfies his
adheSion to certain sen$1ble notes as "analyt1e. n and h1a
rejeot1on o.r another beoause he cla1ms it is synthetlo.
I can oognize beforehand by analys1s the oonoept1on or
bod7 tbroueh the oharaoteristios of extension, U1pGne.
trabi11ty, shape. eto., all whioh are oogitated in this
oonoeption. But now I extend 't1tI' knowledge, and looldng
baok on experienoe from which I had derived th1s oonoeption of' bod,.., I .rind-weight at all times oonneoted
I

j

30

Ibid. 30-31.
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with the above characteristics. and the:vefore I S,nthgtically add to ~ oonoeptions this as a predicate • • • 1
FOur things whioh Kant says 1n the passage just quoted are (l)
that weigh' is a note added on synthet1callT. (2) that 1n ex-

perience we1ght 1s seen to be oonnected with otbBr oharaote:z.-..
lsttas that ar& analrt1cal. (3) that extension, impenetrabilltr.
and shape are cogitated 1p the conception snd are analytioal,
and (4) that this previous oonoeption VIas derived .t'l'om exper-

1enQ••

Kant efters no reason why some of these empiricallydlscovered oharaoteristics of a bodY" are analytical while weightt
ls srnthetloal.

\'¥h7 d ges he choose to

shape and weight?

draw the 11ne between

Is shape oontainea more

1n the conoep1i ot bodJ'.

~adloal17

than we1gb'

Perhaps. Yet this oannot be pl'oved b7

the dogmatic at£1vmatlon that up to a certain point the
is analytioal, but anything be'1ond it is s1nthetleal.
noI'm app.ars arbItrary. 52
1 I

I

It. 1

31

Ibid.

oonoep~

Kamts

8'1

A note about this
t~eat1ng

concept.

tne seoond

t1~st

example leads loglcallr lnto

manner or torm1ng

arblt~ary

~e

8ubJeot-

It should be noted tbat When Kant oODsldera 1mpene.

trabl11t,- aa Sap)'lo!t in th& concept of body. he views it as an

abaol.,s ..t'~'but., not as a 3Jtola..tlon

lns.33TbJ.a very attr1bute is

Q

Ol'

relative

pOWEr

or

aot-

good example ot Xtult'a arblt;x-a-,

rirless 8inoe he make. lmpenet1"abl11t1 anal,.1;ioal, and thel'etox-e.
WllYet'aal and n •••• ,uU'7, without re,8.2:"4 to the tacts of ex.pel'l-

.lM..

~s

vle. of lJ1Penetl'ab111t:r as an alulolllte attrib._ 1.

to be expeoted alnee bnti, 1;le4 down by b1s atat1., essential-

lst10 war Of concelving thlnsa,36 thought that

ft. oenoept must,

in 1tll oonnotatlon" be an abstraotod e:ttr1bll1;• • • • Relational
thinking a.nd the oonoept. ot relation a1'e 19no:t"84.-3& Slno.

attribute. hay. 1;heU suttioient reason in tbe e.seno. of the
thins, the,. can be analyzed in that oonoep' 1t8elf.

But alno.

the aut.t101eJlt reason for a :relation cannot 'be found 1n the

oonoept. ae1thar- can the relation be artalyae4 there.SeAn instane. ot 'this ol1nginS to on17 absolute ootUltltu-

enil attl'lbute.

000 __

in Kant's Introduotion

w}:IIl".·.

he ,a,,:

••

33 Ct. "Von del" tal.chen Sp1tst1ndigkelt der Vler
Syl1og1stlohen t'iglUten,tt Kant
FIe"., II, 65-66.
l

34

'.

Ct. Gl1eon, Bel~ !-!J~_ ~_~ ~lo~~1?~~.s., 120.

35 Smith, 0l!!!niuarz, 181.

36 Paton, Kant's Me1sasa&o 0,1 ExpeJ.-i;an4"

85-86.

as
In the oon.eptlop of $o£!t91n~ that lreD!, lind •••

think an existence whIo a cer,aln t

anlaoedea, and

!'rom this I can d8:r.wlve analytioal Juds-nta. Bu.t thB
oonoeption of a cauae l1es quit. out ot tbe ahove cop.
oept1on arid indioate. some'khios ent~e17 different from
tthat whioh UPpeDS!:' and is consequent17 not contalne4
in that eonceptlon.~'
~h$

oon.eption, "that Wbioh happens,- slnoe It implies onl1

absolute attributes oanno", contain an easenilal relation to
whi. c9.U$ed 1t to happen.

~

exolu8'1on

or

tha~

essential ••latlone

in the subject Jd.ght ba'fe oau.ed an $.ll1U81ng speotaOl$ bad Kant. II

(lon'eapol'ul•• om"tl1enge<l b1a to elassity the t,llowing judgment;
/

I

e.s either analJ'1i10 or s"nthet1e J

oh11drc;u;1

at'e tbe ott.prinS of

I

parents.

The proposition 1s unl".raal. ana

080818&1"7_

b

_an-

las of Offspring 11 a'baol",. in so tar as 1t 1ndlo&t.. tbe su'bje.t of senera'ion. but it 18 a180 8.sent14117 l.'elat1ve 1n 80

tu a.

s.-

neofuulU'l17 1Ilpl1es the sen.el'atOl'a.

erea as suoh, are an
(l'~latlY~).

.~1.

0h11dJ*.n, oons1d.

t4 ••••nt1&117 relative 'being'

Butltani 'b7.paa •• s the po.s1bll1ty of such belng.,

in hold1ng that beinS can and shou.14 be

00ll()eive4

only aa

a1:ulolute. static pel".reetion.38
Th18 .'bud,. of the nO%"'m used b7 Kal11i in QcbdttinS
!!1~

into concepta .has brought out

t~

taot that 'his

h~

ErJ5wal

89

•
arbitral',. both with regard
to certain sensible charaote%'ist1ca
and with resard to relat10ns.

The limits of this thesis do not allow a thorough
e7..aminat1on into the nat.e of KAnt's judgments considered aa
ooaplet. wholes.

lIowever. the evldene. a'l.r>ea.ay seen in the in-

vestigatlon o~ the natve of' Kant.a judgments aoooltding to their

constitutive part. of oopula and oonceptions seems
tiate the 1'011...1ng SUl'.lll1tlr7

oonsider Juds-at
not

eJltH~'"

&8

vl....

'0 substan-

Kant does not habituall,.

an 8aentlally spiritual operation.

He d•••

into the question wh7 men neoeauul)'l11 make Juds-nt8

1n oomlug to know 'bhinss.

R1a knowledge about the .fU.nda.mental

natue and oallSes of J\ldpem appear. neither yeV1 aecuratHI nol'
pl'otound.

1'beretOl'e. in sUlJaDing up this st\l4;r of'

Kant'. pt-emt••

that the predi.ate's Jlon-t,n.lus1on 1n the sUbJeot.eonoep1;

nON of a 8J'Q.thetlo judgment, tl'Ve oauso. should be
as vltlat1n,g Kant.s dlvls10n ot judgaaant..

~G7

'*

the

h1shUg'h~o4

W01"$

xant"

tailu.tt. (1) to 1'eoon011o in his division both tN.l varlo1;,. in
_nts apprehensions

or

the oonne.ting link between, S. and P. and

the obJect1•• taot, indepe!ld.nt; of a huDlan knowel'. of .. neoes.u,._ contingent oonneot,lotlJ (2) to eatabllah a

n01'Jl

to. de-

"'eX'll1Jllns the adm.$.1on of not.s into a oonoept1,oJl' (3) t.

emphasize the qu1ddltrot the understood ooncep1iJ (4) to oon.ide%'
the 1mpl1eatlou of ne•••• a~,. x-elatlona in e.sentlallJ relative

90

belnss, (5) to grasp accurately and profoundlY the natu.e ana
neoess1q- ot

h~

judgments, whioh were the matter that Kant

undertook to div1de.
Tho validity of Kant.s premise on tbe diviSion oE judg.
lJl$ntu, has been examined and 11;s weakness exposed.

NOW it, tOl'

this

tho aake of arguaentJ, 11; w.~. conoeded, not gran1icH3. thai;

prel'd.s$ were valid, liQuid Kant 'a argument tor the extstence of
sJUthatt.o jUdgJ1_n"bs!.

23:'ieI&

aotuaU1 prove' The existenoeot

s,uthe":1.c 3udgments m1ght be estab11sbed solldl,. enough.

whether those 3udpents would 'be also .l

m:~o~'

in Kant'. sen••

would depend on th1l stpength of Kant IS oth.er pramse..

,1;"00. are

Bu'

Row

these pl1eJa1se. by the_elves. apat't from 1;he :f1aws

d1soovere4 1n

BAn,'.

~hou.gb

dlvis:1.on of 3udgmentt

the l.bl1ts of thls thesls do net pe:t!dt all

InvEulf;1ga.tlon of how strong eaoh of the tour remainIng preld.aea

mar be. nevertb81esl it seoma wise to
. sbow the weakness of
anouh$l' KantianpJ'6I1d.se.

7e~

Thel"efOl'G. the moat .fundameJltJal prem-

1.8 1••he••• tor exaudna1l1on.

Th1a Pl'eJd.ae 1s lQ;.u:at'a vie.

that hi. tfOoper1l1oan Revolut1on" 18 a luatlf'1a.'ble bfpothella.
:ftle oaue leading Kant to foranulate 'h1s v1_ 1'Ias one

of the

gen.~al

Oause. tbe.' led hi. to

'0

.'&1'"

his o!'1tJ.cal study.

Whr had _taphJ1tl0. oome
a stand'id.ll? WbJ 'fIas " so •• 11'..
contradiot_,.., '1b7 had it net found the a_e pe.:tIh Of scienee'
Kant

arsued

c~o'l,.

to so_ .t'\maaaen1ull Jd.atake, and then 1.\'.,.

91
amon, other possibillties he ohose

~o

slngle

ou~

as the oulprlt

the tJ.'aditlona1 doot%'ine of tl:ul mind'. oonfol'm1ty to things.

Betare an examination of the reasonableness or th1'
choloe, attention should be cs.lled to one ot Kant's fo.tlle'e •

• here he sa,••
In this PJreta.. I 1;ros.1; the new _tapbi's1oal _thed as

a J:o"pothesls with the y1•• of rendering appaJ.'ent th.
tbst attempt. at suoh a change of _thod, whlch ue
~.a:r. bJ'pOifu..et10a1. BUt in "he CP~lp 1"8.1t lt
lJihe Dew ._aplqaloal metho4J wllt
. elaOna'rated,
net·lqpethttlcalll, but apodelotloal17 • • • 39
In thi. note Kant wlshes

"0 ..ast.Q:te bts read.,... tbat although the

fust step in the 0EI'Mu. 18 onl,. lQ'pothetllal. this should not
.aWl. the reader to he'ltate, since 1at;er on the corre.tnea. ot
tb1s ft.st step w111 be proved.
0p,~tliU.

This proof oocurs 1n tibe

it.ell when the sirlking taol11t1 which this hJ'potheala

po.se.... tor cutting the knot. of all .-taphrslcal anttnomie.
18 di.pl.,ed. 40 a.\ l' .hould be rememb.~e. that ..~. eaae 1n
solving an'lnomies 1s not an intrtnaio

~~nt

tor the

t~u~

of

an h1'Pothes1a.
Roweyer, this note does not mean that Kant ••

ar~n

tatioD 1s eve. independ.nt of this starting DJpotheal..

..

It i.

always the neces.a.ry condition fot' eJd..&lting !. 21'11E& knowledg. 41
•

1

,qr&'&g:e,

39

Kant,

40

Kant, Q,ritlii!, 311-312, 311-521.

41 Paton, &sa"!

14.

,,'apbl.d .c JJJ.

aerleno,.,

"I8~

92
and the T1'anacendental Aesthetlc and Anal,.tic rest on
~ 2rlo~&

knowledge_ A. a

~esult

ex1.'lna

Of this initial bJpothea1••

one th1ng CaD be aeen alfeoting tbe entire Kantlan

sr.te~

I'

tl that the Karl1;Un ph11oloph7 in all lts ramif1oation. po••
sease. no

~e.'e~

ya1141t1 281' ! l than this starting point.

The _thod ot s tud71ng th1s .t'UJldaJl$ntal pram1..8 ot
knt wl11 cODsl.t; in presentlng and c01l'lU1Gntlng on the aal1e111;

palsages in wh10h

1t.aXltl

poalts b.1a Oopernioan Revolut10n.

In the fDa'i of tlul•• passages Kant sa781

It appears to me that the example. of _t~_tl0' ahCl
nat1.unl1 ph11osop1l7 ••• al'e auttlclentll reJllU'kable
••• to lnduoe WI to aa1ce the expex-iJlent ot 1JI11Ult1nS
them, so tar as t:t. analog whioh, as rational selenee••
tber be.. to ..'apbJslc. mar permit_'S
Two questions artIe upon ex.aa1nlng this text.

F1rat. al'e tblt

examples of _the_tile. and nat_al ph11osopbJ' aotual17 sutts.-

clout (and' not mere17 appal'entJl1 so) to 3ustif1 the expet'iaen'

1'aJa' proposes'

bat sara th$,. appear sUffioient I and ,.8t tbe

pl'eoed!ng h1ato"s.o akebob•• he haa given of the al1esed17 sudden
atsltts 1n the other aoleno.a al's not ••t down aa 801entltlG data
nor arranged to eft••t a demonatx-ation fro. proved

~'orl.

taeta.
Despite th1a inoonolusive appeal to hist __,.. however,
there -7 have been sUffioient reason to bdtate the ot_.
lJ1

I• •

93

solenee., provided oare was taken to avold 1n1tial erl'CW8 aM

to be sure that

~

1m1tatlon a1w&7s proceed reasonablr.

The seoond qUestion 18, how tar doe. the analogJ ot
the other lWatlonal IUll.noes to m.etapu,sloa alloW ot an attempt

a1; 1rA1tatlng the.,
11kewi •• '

'l'hel use }qpothe'...

Can _tapl:q'slo8 dO

Yes, 'but onl,. in a s1m118l.*11 l1ra1te4

the aatve of aa hJ'pothes!s 1s suoh

a8

UEUiI..

Sino.

to glY$ '07 itselt onll

pl'oba'ble know).edge. and s inoe tb1s caD 'Oeeo.. the (uar'ain knowl-

edge propel" to 8cleDoe 0017 bJ' em.plo71ng

80me

oer1;&1n Pl'Uloiplea

to dellOws'bt-ate tllat the lQ'pothGsia 1n qustlon 18 th$ unique
posslble explanation." "
~

bfpotheaia

~t

tollowa tbat 'he leglt1Jaate

Wle

ot

be to d••• lop those certain prino1ples

whioh the .81ent1at atready holds.

Tbus. 1t 11.1 not 1101t \0

Surelr the mnd'.
relation to the thins known ls a tirst pl'1holple in the aot ot
make an l'q'pothEut18 about t1l'st principles.

knowing.
Ell'ld

It 1s l'eoegnlsed 1mpllcltl,. in the aot of knowins.

1s a tirst prinoiple in the metaphJslca of cognition.

oem-

sequentlJ. in to1'1tl1ng a bJpothesla about this relation, ltaatJ
has exceeded the 111n1ted area in whicb. alone the h1'Pothetlcal
III

43 St. ~mal, 1_ T. j I, 32, 1, ad 2, exemplifIes
this lD adducing the geocent~:rc hypotheSis and noting, oenturies
bet.)!'. OopettnlcWI, its ess8nt1al \Vealmeaa. "Siout in astl'elogia
ponltUl' 1'at10 exoentricol'. _, ep1cyolol'um ex hoo quod, ha.
positione facta, possunt salva!'! apparentla sensibilia c~oa
aotus oaeleate., non tamen ratIo haec est auttlclente~ probans,
qu.I. e1;lam terti. a118. posItion. taota aalvari poasent.-

reason.
But Kant sal's, 1IIt has hltherto baen assUDl6d that ...

cognitions ItWJt oontorm to the objeota."44

Have all Kant'.

p1'edeoessor. made this asaum,pt1ontSll1th, while admitting tMe

"assumption did aotually underlie one and all pre-Kant1an ph1-

loaophie8,- notes tbat U. . , Maleol'8.nob.e, and Lelbnltz had
pe.x-tial.l'r antloipated Kant's .,vtl 1'8"01'88.1 of 11; ••6
I

IAQt olaaa1:f:tes thb waiSt tlonal doet1'1ne that

OlUt

oognitions ItUSt oontOl'JJl to the objecta known as an aaaumptlon.
Was th1s ' ...eh1ng aasUllfltd, tak,en to'1/! gttanite41

in tbe aocepted aena. at "a'8'UDlPtlon."

1'0, at leut not

Ord1nu1 men have

abundanit evldenoe for this ooot1'18$, jut as the,- haYe abundant

evidenoe that tire bw.'ns wood and not
o! treque.t experien..

o~18

tn..

v&~~

I.er!u:" tof!

~

t."..e

to __ this 3udtPl'nt whioh..

lo_one I'd.ght 1008817 dub as an 1IaS81.Ul\Ptl0D.-

TIM

tina's .on....

formit1 to the thlng 18 a taot that 18 immedlatel,. evtden'b to
reflective alnd. tbat are ru)t busee! '07 aultjeotlv1st10 doubiul.

More«ex-" philosophers, p:rob1ng 1ni;o tbis baa" prbclple ot the knowing P1'oo ••• , have ana17Hc1 1t and shown it to

lJe a ft'J:'7 wel.l-founded "assumpt1on. -

'"

Itan•• C:rlty_, 1.2.

45 Smith, 0fll!1!S'a.x-X. 21.

For example,

st.

Tho. ._
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Aqulnas prooeeds

~om

and the thing known.

the evident d1atinction between the

kn.w.~

Then he 81mp17 X'a1sea the familial' daU,.

experleDoe or "IfY$ sot 1t,"

O~

"Oatoh on?" to a philosophioal

level bJ a1ia.ttng thai; somehow the tshins known 18 1n the knoweX',
that some union has 'been atteoted

bet1fMD the tViO.

Blat

this

union oan onl,. be aohieved 'b7 the ,\to having something 1n

COJAtnOrl,

b1 a sharing 1Jl some "tON, ttb7 sOSIle"oontol'mit;l." as th$
soholutl08

and since the knower was prevlous17 wlthou'll

lUi,.,

this t . . (fer o1i1l.erwbe h8 would al1'8ad;y haVe b$en knowing tbe
ob,eot;). b.e could onl,. have 1'80$1.,.4 'h1s t.oft1

trOll

1Ihe thins

known, thl-ougb. lts $%pel'1eno&4 aotion tQ?on h1a in. a.Gordan••
w1tih the law tba t S-' ~se,n,tf.

eai !

!1'U

.a:a&l~.

Bow 'basides the welght or unlTal's.l , •• ttmon7 and tbe
studied approval of eOllP8tent phllosophel'S, this 80.0alled
ff· us \111lPtion"

preset'"..,d

pre.established

_1'1 fa

~tJ1

thinking from the a'bsU1'<1!:t7 of a

In all 1ntelleo's •. fttl' strange thingl

would have been noticed 1t objeot;s had to conform to our huaaan
Were this t;he e.. fle. Kaat m,lgb:t e ..al1y haft 418.

oogh! tion.

cavered the following nonsena ••

Each and ••eI'1 good Koen!ss'bel'ser, it po1nt.dlJ ques.

tloned by Prot.ssw Kaat out on h1s late anemoon "t,..ell,
would have begl'*ttdl1ngl7 admitted \hat; his be1...4 01t7 .._

oooupied <lurins the Seven Year War beoa,ua6 of RussU'. 1d11iHil17
supel'lol'ltr.

a.t

U the Cla\UJe of this al:l.aJnetul contesaion welle

I,

II'

I

I

I,·

II

H

'ougb1;.

Ian,

nolghbolf'8

ft~e

the l"olatloft
.1JIItJ • • •_

would have cU.aeovel'Gd that ,_ minds

or ca._all",

data

~

,he .~

time, pJ,aoe, J>$ople. and

80

AM all

one of tiM. could •••

ttf.J't

'hUlk1ns, Xoeuipbe.... taU _4

!btl_.'" 19'. ,.- ''''4Icto

a•• ' • ....'111.r7 aDd

eYeD'..

1n __ l1*a••

IV'Goth,
OWQ

w..,. to ."'1J' tile

..,"10. "lid'"
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These two terms are the rna. tex-1al thing known, and the hums.n

knower, "the lowest of intelleotual substanoes."47
The

next statement of Kant that should be oommented

on ocours When Kant states w1thout qua11f1oation that the
asaumption 01' hav1ng objeots necessarlly conform to our oogn1t10n
appear. at all events, to acoord better with t~ 20881b).11tl of our ga1ning the end we have 1n view.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
When we have attained that eud, We shall then be oonv1noed 01' the truth of that4~h10h we began by assuming
tor the sake of exp~riment.
Two 001;1008 whioh Kant affirms hers are (1) that his assumption
appears the better possible way to his end, and (2) the atta1nment of this end proves the truth of his aS8tUtJ,ptlon.

Several

remarks mus t be made,

Regard1ng the flrst notion, Kant's assumption mal
appea1'50 to him. to be more oonduoive to his end.

Be offet's no

47 Cf. AqUinas, In II !!1., 1, nne 278.285, where
these two $OUl'ces of d1ffio'Utt7 are oleul;y treated.
48

KAnt_ Crlt&au$. 12.

49

Ibla, 13-14,

50 It should be noted that the two chief reasons b;y
whioh Kant seeks to bolster his "Copernloan Revolution" 1n
metaphr.Jlcs have "appeu" as their oopula instead of "is."
These reasons are (l) the examples of the scienoes af2e~ suffi.
clent to induce the Revolution, and (a) the metaph;YS oat Revolutlon appears better suited to Kant.s end. Thus be starts the
metaphysical Revolution.
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solld reasons to make it appear so to his raader.
statement be oons1dered absolute17, as "It
b1e way to

mr

But 1f hi.

!! the bette.

pO.81~

end of scient1fic knowledge," one should note that

the type of sc1entif10 knowledge allowed by Kant.s hypothesi.
1s only about phenomena and oannot oonta1n affirmations or
nO\U.n&nal value.
Moreover, 1t could not be stated with oert1tude that
Kant •• a:unuuptlon would E.!. the 'best way to soientific knowled,e,
unless all the possible assumptIons have oertainly been <U.s.
l
1

oovered, and this one found to be oertainly superior to all.
In 14710g the foundation for his 87_em, Kant does not tan), to
establish these things.

Kant'. aeoond notion, Which oan correotly be Americanized into "It 1t works, itfs true," ultimately depends on tbe
t~e

definition ot tru'h.

If truth ts

cohe~eno.,

then

lab,'.

state_ni; lIII17 be tru, tor aome eOllP.'ent cr1tic. have attlrad

that there are no 1'01'_1

oont~ad1otion8

1n ltant's .18tem. that

1t is a genera1lr coherent whole. 51 But 1f truth include. coherence but ala. demands something motte, then the consistency
ot Kant's sTstem do•• not demonstrate 1ts truth anT more tban
the oons18tenc1 ot Rtemann's geometry establishes th$ truth ot
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that elaboration of

ooh8~ent

thought.

The tinal words to be studied in examining the valld.

iv"

of Kant t •

pre~e

about inverting the knowledge-relation
are, ftwe here propose to do just what Oopernious dld.· 52 NQW
ald Kaprla ae1Juall1 do jut Vlhat Oopernicus dldt--that is, were
both

~e

a.trono..~'s and the philosopher's initial thinking

about the1&' respect1ve problems 8trlot17 parallel regattdle•• of
the ettect. tbat tollowedf
Ironical as 1t may seem, Kant.s "Oopernican Revolu-

tion ft was not

Oope~loan

enough to be sCientltical17 aocurate,

as w111 appear in the subsequent paragraphs.

Copernious bad

notioed the difficultie. 1n 8s1;rono., resulting from ptolemr'.
geocentrio h7Pothea1a.

Start1ng with the Aristotelian princi-

ple regard1nl looal mot1on, Oopern1ous argued that, "All apprehended obange of plaoe is due to move_at either of the observed

obJeot or ot the cbsen•• , or to dUterenoes in move_Xlii thai;
are oocurring simultaneous17 in both. M53 ~hua Oopernlcu. besan
w1th

Three

po.sible explanations ot the evident motion.

EIther

the sun and stars alone move. or the earth alone IlOYeS, 01' both
are moving but at difterent

V6~ooltles.

52 Kant, Cr&t1qUe, 12.
53 This translation ot Oopernious' D-,
1s taken from Sm1th, Q-.ntal"I' 24.

Revolutioeib~
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But Kant .. while pl'otessedly imitating Copernious,
adduoes onll tw, possibilities to explain ths oontormtt 7 1n
oognition

w~ch

18 evident upon

~etleot1on.

Be sa18, "Eltb8~.

first, I mal assume that the conoeptions •••

oonfo~m

to the

object ••• or, seoondl,., I ma7 aS8um.e tbat t;he objeots •••
oonform to mr oonceptions. 54 But where 1s tbe t~d possibility!

Kant neither oonsiders nor adds the logioal "or, thirdly,

I may assume that the oonoeptions oontorms 1iC) the object and

j

the objeot

oonto~

to the oonoeption, but under dlfterant

aspeet•• "
The Copernioan theory st111 rema1ns hypothetical
today,

rOll'

the third possibility of a twofold IIOTe_rd; has de.

finitely not been diaproved.

S1m11~17,

th& Kantlan ths0rT,

even if the initial biPoth$sis were formulated about 1101t
matter, v40uld st111 be on11 probable, as the thittd po.aloll.it,..

of a $wowway causalltJ baa not been proved impossibl.e.
fheretOl-e, in

s'WIUBarlz1ng

this study of Ke.nt t • rad1-

oal twisting 01' the conformity 1n knowmg, one discove2:ta that

his bJpothetlcal argument 1s not only solent1t1eal17 inoomplete

tor talling to consider a third hypotbesis, but also involves
1111c1' matter for a bJpotbs.la.

Oonsequently, Kant'. argument

tor the enstence of 81Ilthetl0 judgmen'ba !. E%l12r,1, %le.tins as
I.
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it doe. upon 'bbla invalid br.vothLlau and u,pon hS.a exce,u,lve17
I,nabJeotlVG and 41'1U.t.nl"1 (l1v1a1011 of

Judgments, does no' p1"cwe.

conCLUSION
Dw:t:1ns the <'-lvslop_ut; of this ibeau tha central line
Of tb.o~ -7

have .en

obaoUJNlld 1>7 the trequeat

ch'u1ect

afnuU... 11hich see.d neo ••u'ftU7 tot' a thcX"ough .,tablla_h' .,

Con••queml,._ 1n oloain,& 'hla Inv8st1sat1on of Kant"

the p)!'Oot.

lntrodue'.., fta.ord.ns, it _,. be well to l'ov1n ,he -ill Un. ot
the a).9~b".

b

re
~

t1:»

tM11. aimed at shoWing 'bat tbe:ve 18 no Mo••• lt,

.!~,

to,..

in Kant, a1000 t;he

101v8d br poaltln& Ube$e

1Jhat are !nvaUd. Kanu

A SE&I£& t .... ,

Kant'. oC!u'ltl'al pltoblem.

mordu.

alII'

~

p•••uppoa••

dOH bot beed the 8.D1nN,.. he

oaue the pJ'oblea it . . ma4. to
_DU .l

oenv"al Pl'o'bl-.

&l1._~

Watll

whJ.oh

~e.

lnwnto4 b$-

doea no' owt_

Bow &1'0 8711'1»"0 SudS-

possible' lie amRfel'e4 b1 sayi.n8 'hat ..._

po.sible 'bhrough!.

itt~~d f . .

Medea sJn'lwfaU of predloate aDd lub3ect.

opqina qu••'lon

w.~

3udB-

whl0h l.aMoD . .
Leading up '0 kn•••

flvo cleu atop. of reaaon1ns.

.'epa .. pl".Id.••• to Kant'. opening question ._"'

1'be.. flft

(1) that ~1w

l
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~othes1s

of his "Copernloa.n Revolution" ln epistemology is

justified. (2) thai; unlV61"sallty and neoesslty aJ:te the sign'
of !. Pl"121'1 judgmeat' •• (3) that !. 2rlor,1 judgments exist 1n the

solenoes, (4) tbat the

o~lterlon

of synthetl0 judgments 1s the

predlcate'. non-inolusion in the subjeot •• oontent, and (5) that
th& 801anoe. aotually oontain synthetio

jud~nta ~

irlorl.

Of thEtae tiTe pre1'l1aea the pre.en' theal. examined the moat
important one., the fll'st and the fourth.

It ahowed them hot

strong enoup tOlupport fUrther l'eaaonlng.

Reviewing the first pre.i..e, one reoalls that

Kant'.

J'Oopernlcan Revolution" oonslated in the hypothesi•.tbat alnce
the dootrine

Of

the l'ldnd' 8 eonfol'lI1 ty to things bad nO'", avoided

diffioult!•• in tha past, 1t was 1101t to reYerae the relation
and have 'hing.
can on17 "

C011tOt'm iH> the

used to help

mind,

~x,.teB4

Now .. bJpot.heal' b,. nature

s01enoet not to s1;al"

1'_

There

can. 'llheretOl-e, ba noh,Jpothea1a about; starting principles.

But

.tn-e17 tl» III1no'. ):tela. t10n to the 'h1ng known 18 a .'baninl
p1'lnolple 1n tM ae' of lmowinfh

?!h1a relation ls, consequent.

11, beyond the 11m1t. allowed to a valld bJpotbeal.. Kant t •
tlrat premiae exceeded the bounds ot pure reason.
Beside. this initial flaw, Ran"_ Copernican Revolutlon oontradioted experlenoe and trad1t10n, it led to absUl'd

oonsequenoes when applied to real lite, and

br

not adatttlna

the poss1bi11ty of a third hypothesis, it tailed to imitate
Copernicus olosel, enough to be oalled valid reasoning.

This

bJpotbea1s ora knowing process involving a mutual oausal.

~hird

1t1 exst-fi.d b1 both th1ng and mind without ohange in the thine

i8

emb~aoed

in tbb Scholastio dootrine of abat.act1on.

'lhe fourth prem1se was also oaretul17 .orutinlzed.

This premi•• dealt with the norm Kant used in dividing judgments.

It was found tha:~ his division was ob.cfI.4'G and arb1tra 17

becaue the ju.dgments Which Kant divided were onl,- cbsovel,.
g~asped

the

and arbitrarily 01ass1t1ed.

Ouv stud,. first examined

tiN of jUdgment., nlunel1, the copula, and showed from.

Kant's own writing. and from oompetent critio. tbat .. tailed

to diat1ngu1.h betw.en the obj••tlve taot of a relatlon exiStins

between sub3ect and predioate and the knowerla

ap~eh.nsion

ot

th1s ltelation. Tlda tail_e to d1st.1nguish was one of the maUl

source.

obscU%titr in Kant.s division of judgments.

o~

~n
mat~e!

leate.

ot

the .stud,

jud~DtSt

fbe

~esult

,1' the tourth premiae exam1.ned the

oa.-1y, the conoepts 01' subjeot and

p~.d

was the disooyery of subjectivism aQd sens1am

in Kant's concepta and arbitrariness in the norm. used in adld.tt-

ins not.s t. thea. concep1ua.

Th1s subjectivism and arbitx-arl-

ness in both concepts and oopula. inoluding his retusal to adml'
neoCUlsa17

liS a

relations into conoepts .1' 8slent1&117 relative belngs.

••oond ohiet acuroe of obscurity in Kantts division ot

l

lOS
t.rh••• iDYaUd premis•• make tbe quoatlon baaed upon
thea

urmeoe"'8arr. oonaequen1il,. the !. il-&E&

anl.er that ques1iJ.on at.-e alaounDGcossalT.

t..".

neede4 , .
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